



European Network of Councils  
for the Judiciary (ENCJ)

Réseau européen des Conseils  
de la Justice (RECJ)

# ENCJ Survey among judges

on the Independence of  
the Judiciary

## 2025



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ENCJ 2025

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## Summary<sup>1</sup>

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The survey among the judges of Europe about their independence took place for the fifth time in the first quarter of 2025. In total 19,136 judges from 32 judiciaries of 30 countries participated. The target for participation was set at 20%, which most judiciaries (easily) achieved. The analysis of personal and professional characteristics in relation to the perception of independence shows that per judiciary judges hold very similar views.

The main findings are:

1. Judges generally evaluate their independence positively. On a 10-point scale, judges rate the independence of the judges in their country on average between 5.9 and 9.8 with the lowest score for Ukraine, followed by Montenegro (6.8), Hungary (7.0), Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina (both 7.1). The scores of ten judiciaries are 9 or higher. The respondents rate their personal independence even higher: between 6.8 and 9.9. Consistent with the positive assessment of independence, few judges report inappropriate pressure to influence judicial decisions.
2. Since 2015, when the first survey took place, independence has gradually improved on average for all judiciaries together. However, this trend comes to a halt in this survey, where depending on the yardstick the average score across countries remained the same or declined somewhat since the previous survey. Based on the experience of judges who have been working for many years, independence has improved over a longer period.
3. Examining the judiciaries individually, in most of them perceived independence remained high or improved since the first survey. However, in some judiciaries the respondents see declines. This is the case in Hungary which participated for the first time in 2019, but also in Montenegro and Greece (foremost civil and criminal courts) declines occurred and to a lesser extent in Slovenia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the independence score is stable at a low level.
4. Judges rate the independence of councils for the judiciary on average per country between 3.4 and 9.7. The councils of Spain and Bulgaria are awarded very low scores, while the scores for Hungary, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina are low. Scores above 8 are found in Finland, Ireland, Romania and the UK. Having a council is not enough to guarantee judicial independence. This depends highly on the arrangements, for instance, with regard to the appointment of the members of a council, but it depends also the way they act once elected or appointed as members of the council.
5. The issues that have been raised in the previous surveys continue to exist. In many judiciaries, judges are critical about human resource decisions concerning judges and, in particular, about appointment and promotion. In the view of respondents, also appointment to the Supreme Court/Court of Cassation remains problematic in a variety of countries.
6. Corruption remains an issue in several judiciaries. In a wider range of judiciaries, the judicial authorities are seen as not doing enough to address judicial misconduct and corruption.
7. Court management including the court presidents generally do not try to influence the content of judicial decisions. Some judges experience, however, inappropriate pressure by court

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<sup>1</sup> This report was composed by Mr. Frans van Dijk (ENCJ and Montaigne Centre for Rule of Law and Administration of Justice, University of Utrecht), Mr. Bart Diephuis (Netherlands Council for the judiciary) and, for Section 11, Mr. Kamil Jonski (SGH Warsaw School of Economics). Technical support was provided by the High Council of Justice of Belgium; Mr. Kevin Verhoeyen. Overall support was provided by the ENCJ Office.

management to meet timeliness standards, and more judges experience inappropriate pressure from production targets.

8. The tensions between the judiciary and the other state powers are also not a new issue, but the difficulties have increased in many respects. The survey highlights in particular: (1) lack of implementation by governments of judicial decisions that go against the interest of government has increased, (2) working conditions are increasingly becoming a threat to independence, in particular the low/lagging remuneration of judges and high workload/insufficient court resources and (3) lack of respect for judicial independence by government and parliament is in many countries a large and increasing issue, according to the respondents.
9. In most judiciaries, judges feel inappropriate pressure from the (social) media at case level. Many of them feel that their independence is not respected by/on the (social) media.
10. For the first time, the survey looked into intimidation and threats as well as actual attacks on judges. In half of the judiciaries more than 10% of the judges experience intimidation or threats. These judiciaries vary from the UK, in particular Northern Ireland, to Norway, Hungary and Ukraine. While threats occur hardly regularly, occasional occurrence is quite common. Physical attacks on judges are rare.

Most of the judges in Europe are positive about their independence, but they identify issues that affect their independence negatively. Some of these issues are at the case level, others at the system level, such as appointments. The survey provides many insights into the functioning of the judiciary at national level. It is up to the Councils for the Judiciary and other governing bodies to analyse the outcomes for their judiciaries and address the issues that are raised by the respondents. While Councils are dependent on the other state powers for improvement of legislation and for adequate resources, judiciaries and in particular Councils can address many issues by themselves. Still, the problems are increasing with the other state powers, and more respect for independence is necessary.

Most of the issues raised in the survey are not new and require higher priority to resolve. In addition, the dialogue must be sought or continued with the other state powers and also with the media to promote a better understanding of the importance of judicial independence for the functioning of society and its economy. At the same time, it is advisable to increase the resilience of judges and governing institutions of the judiciary in the face of mounting tensions and threats.

The dataset of the survey is available on request.

## 1. Introduction

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Central to the mission of the ENCJ is the reinforcement of independent and accountable judiciaries in the European Union to guarantee access to fair, independent and impartial courts. To this end, the ENCJ is working systematically to develop standards and guidelines for the governance of the judiciary and the conduct of essential functions such as the appointment of judges. To assess the extent to which standards and guidelines are realised a set of indicators on independence and accountability has been developed and implemented. These indicators concern, on the one hand, the formal safeguards and mechanisms that protect judicial independence and provide for accountability and, on the other hand, the perceptions of independence in society. The judges are, obviously, important actors in this field. Their views are of particular interest, all the more because they seldom express opinions. In the European Union, the perceptions of citizens and companies about judicial independence are annually surveyed by Eurobarometer. The data from these surveys is included in the ENCJ indicators of independence and accountability. The perceptions of judges on independence are not part of these Eurobarometer surveys, and the ENCJ has taken upon itself to conduct a survey among judges on a regular basis.

In the first quarter of 2025, this survey was conducted for the fifth time. The survey asked judges to give a general assessment of their independence and to assess a range of aspects that affect independence. In addition to the actual functioning of the mechanisms that should safeguard independence, the survey asked the judges whether they felt the independence of the judge was respected by the diverse stakeholders of the judiciary, ranging from the governing bodies of the judiciary, the parties in procedures and their lawyers as well as the other two state powers and the (social) media. The survey also covers several aspects of the accountability of the judiciary.

Judges from 32 judiciaries of 30 countries participated in the survey, in total 19.136 judges. It should be noted that, as in the previous surveys, Poland did not participate in the survey, because its Council for the Judiciary is currently not a member or observer of the ENCJ (subject to the decision of the extraordinary General Assembly in Vilnius, 2021).

The results of the survey are presented here in figures and in tables. In Section 2, the method and content of the survey are described and in Section 3 response and response rate are given. The outcomes of the survey are presented in Sections 4 – 11 in the form of figures and some supporting tables. Section 12 concerns the change over time of judicial independence and Section 13 gives some details of the characteristics of the respondents and its impact on outcomes, further elaborated in Annex 1. Annex 2 supports section 11 on respect for judicial independence. Annex 3 gives the outcomes of the survey in tables.

## 2. Method and content of the survey

First the method of the survey is described, and then the questions posed in the survey are presented.

### 2.1 Method

As in the previous waves of the survey, all judges of the participating judiciaries were invited to take part in the survey. The methodology of the survey was reviewed in 2021, and it was concluded that this is the best approach, given the need to guarantee that all opinions of judges get equal opportunity to be expressed, even under adverse conditions with regard to independence.<sup>2</sup> To check for (self) selection effects, the respondents were not only asked about personal characteristics (gender, experience as a judge), but also about type of court at which they are (primarily) working and type of cases they primarily adjudicate, as well as their membership of a judges' association.

As to the implementation of the survey, all members and observers of the ENCJ (i.e. councils for the judiciary and, where these do not exist, other governing bodies of the judiciary such as ministries of Justice) were asked to take part in the survey. The participating governing bodies distributed a letter of introduction and a recommendation of the President of the ENCJ to all judges within their jurisdictions. The letter contained a link to the internet site of the ENCJ. The governing bodies translated the survey in their languages, and for each language a form was created that was made available on the closed section of the ENCJ internet site with increased security (the platform used to collect responses was SurveyMonkey). The respondents could fill in the survey online anonymously. They were only asked to specify the country in which they were working as a judge. Judges could fill in the survey in any language into which the survey had been translated.

Most councils distributed the letter of introduction directly to the judges. In the absence of centralized contact lists of judges, other councils had to send the letter to the court presidents who then distributed the letter among the judges within their court, or engage with the Ministries of Justice to reach the individual judges. Some councils secured the endorsement and (practical) support of the judges' associations of their countries. The survey was addressed only to professional judges, and not to lay judges. A survey among lay judges was conducted separately in 2018.

The survey is dependent on the willingness and ability of Councils for the judiciary and other governance bodies to co-operate. In total 32 judiciaries from 30 countries participated in the survey (for the UK the judiciaries of England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland are distinguished).

### 2.2 Survey questions

The survey is designed in such a way that it asks judges to give a general assessment of their independence as they perceive it, in order to provide the data for the relevant Independence indicator (I13)<sup>3</sup>, but it also explores different aspects of independence in depth. The substantive questions are essentially the same as in the previous surveys, but questions were added about the occurrence of intimidation and threats of judges by court users and others from outside the courts and actual violence against judges. The essentially stable set of questions contributes to comparability of results over a longer period of time and a possibility to observe trends (see Section 12).

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<sup>2</sup> ENCJ (2021). Report 2020-2021. Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary, Improving Indicators and Surveys. [www.encj.eu](http://www.encj.eu).

<sup>3</sup> ENCJ (2023). Report 2022-2023. Indicators Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary, Reinforcing judicial protection. [www.encj.eu](http://www.encj.eu).

Most questions were posed in the form of propositions. Unless indicated otherwise, answer categories were: Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Not sure, Agree and Strongly Agree. In the presentation of the results, the categories strongly disagree and disagree, as well as strongly agree and agree, are aggregated to make the figures and tables more readable. To rate independence, a scale from 0 to 10 was used. It should be noted that the survey contains a combination of questions about own experience and about perceptions. The choice for own experience or perceptions depends on the nature of the phenomenon at hand: if direct experience does not or cannot occur, only perceptions are relevant. Also, when a personal question cannot be expected to be answered honestly, a more general question is in order. With regard to the rating of independence, both experience and perceptions are used. Where relevant, the survey asks respondents to consider the last three years, since the previous survey in 2022.

The questions/statements that were used in the current survey are the following in logical order.

### ***Independence***

#### **Overall perception of independence**

Q1 Rate the independence of the professional judges in your country on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").

Q2 Rate your own independence as a judge on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").

Q3 Rate the independence of the Council for the Judiciary on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").

Q4 I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively.

#### **Authority of judges**

Q5 In the last three years, I believe judgments that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country.

#### **Aspects of independence: influence of the European Union**

Q6 I believe that the independence of the judiciary in my country is strengthened by being part of the European Union, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union or being part of the EEA.

#### **Aspects of independence: case related inappropriate pressure from internal and external sources**

Q7 During the last three years, I have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly and by whom: Constitutional Court, Council for the Judiciary, Court Management, Government, Media, Other judges (including an association of judges), Parliament, Parties and their lawyers, Prosecution, Social Media or Supreme Court/Court of Cassation.

#### **Aspects of independence: case-related external pressure**

Q8 I believe that in my country during the last three years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly.

Q9 I believe during the last three years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case.

Q10 During the last three years my decisions or actions have been directly affected by a claim, or a threat of a claim, for personal liability.

Q11 I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio).

Q12 I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, social media postings (for example, Facebook, X or LinkedIn).

Q13 In the last three years, in my function as a judge, I have been subjected to intimidation and/or threats by court users or others from outside the court.

Q14 In the last three years, in my function as a judge, I have been physically attacked by court users or others from outside the court.

**Aspects of independence: case-related internal pressure**

Q15 During the last three years I have been affected by a threat of, or actual, disciplinary or other official action because of how I have decided a case.

Q16 During the last three years the management of my court has exerted pressure on me to decide individual cases in a particular way.<sup>4</sup>

Q17 During the last three years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to decide individual cases within a particular time.

Q18 During the last three years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to reach production targets (number of adjudicated cases).

Q19 During the last three years I have had to take decisions in accordance with guidelines developed by judges contrary to my professional opinion (guidelines do not include the obligation to follow precedent).

**Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges**

Q20 I believe judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

Q21 I believe judges in my country have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

Q22 I believe judges in my country in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted /appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years. (Note: experience may include seniority).

**Aspects of independence: working conditions**

Q23.1-Q23.6 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: pay/pension/retirement age, working hours,

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<sup>4</sup> This question concerns the content of the case. Such pressure is always inappropriate.

case load, court resources, digitalisation and conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

### ***Accountability***

Q24 In my country, I believe that judges adhere to high ethical standards.

Q25 In my country, I believe that judicial misconduct is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

Q26 In my country, judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

### **Respect for the independence of judges**

Q27.1-Q27.12 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by: (1) Council for the Judiciary, Court Management incl. Court President, Supreme Court/Cassation, Constitutional Court, Association of Judges, (2) Parties in the trial, Lawyers, Prosecution, (3) Government, Parliament, Media (i.e. press, television or radio) and Social Media (for example Facebook, X or LinkedIn).

### **Change over time of judicial independence**

Q28 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much. The answers are combined with Q30.

### ***Personal and professional characteristics***

Q29 Gender

Q30 Judicial experience (years of service as a judge) in categories of years

Q31 Primary place of work (current): Court of first instance, Appeal Court or Supreme Court/Court of Cassation

Q32 Primary field of work (current): criminal cases, administrative cases, civil (including family) cases or all of these in equal measure

Q33 Membership of a judges' association

### 3. Response rate

Judges from 32 judiciaries of 30 countries participated in the survey, in total 19,136 judges, a record number of judiciaries and a record number of judges (29 judiciaries and 15,821 judges took part in the previous survey). The absolute number of respondents is given in *Figure 1*. *Figure 2* gives the response rate per country. The target was maintained at 20% responding judges. This target was not reached in five countries, all large countries. The absolute number of respondents is deemed sufficient to retain all countries in the results, where the outcomes for Italy and Czech Republic need to be treated with extra caution for some of the questions. For both countries the response rate is rather low. This was aggravated for Czech Republic for the two questions on the score of judicial independence (see section 2) by presentational error which affected the first 117 replies, due to insufficient testing. In Italy and in Greece, there are two Councils, one for the courts of general jurisdiction and the other for the administrative courts. The outcomes for the questions that concern the council for the judiciary are, therefore, split according to jurisdiction, but these outcomes must be considered with some caution as the absolute response per jurisdiction is lowered. The high response in absolute terms for several large judiciaries allows for further intra-country statistical analysis that will be undertaken at a later stage.





Figure 1 Number of respondents



Note: the number of judges is based on CEPEJ data of total professional judges in 2022, and updated by Councils for the Judiciary and other governing bodies.


Figure 2 Response rate

In Section 13 the personal and professional characteristics of the respondents are presented. There the differences of the answers among the respondents are also discussed.

## 4. Overall perception of independence

In this Section, the independence scores are discussed with regard to judges and Councils for the Judiciary. Here, the results for the present situation are discussed, while in section 12 the development over time is examined by comparing the outcomes of the five surveys that been conducted since 2015 and in the present survey by the answers to the question on the experienced increase or decline of independence in combination with the length of experience as a judge.

On a 10-point scale, respondents rate the independence of the judges in their judiciary on average between 5.9 and 9.8. By far the lowest score is given by Ukrainian judges (5.9). Montenegro follows with a score of 6.8, Hungary 7.0 and Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.1. The scores of ten judiciaries are 9 or higher. These judiciaries are Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK (England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland). See *Figure 3* which in addition to the scores per country gives the average of the unweighted country scores (red line). Respondents were also asked to rate their personal independence (*Figure 4*). These scores are generally substantially higher than the scores about the judges in general (9.0 versus 8.4 point on average), with the difference generally increasing with the decrease of the independence score. While the two questions differ qualitatively (respondents may view the independence of all judges from a broader perspective than their personal independence taking into account, for instance, the selection of judges), self serving bias likely plays a role.



*Figure 3 Independence of judges in general, scale 0 -10, where 0 means “not independent at all” and 10 means “highest possible degree of independence”*

Note: Average survey 2022: 8.7 Average survey 2025: 8.5<sup>5</sup>

Compared with the previous survey, the unweighted average score for all judiciaries declined by 0.2, while the personal score remained the same.

<sup>5</sup> Average 2025 excluding Moldova, Romania and Ukraine to cover the same judiciaries as in 2022. Same in the note in all following figures.




Figure 4 Personal independence of judges, scale 0 -10 as in Figure 3

Note: Average survey 2022: 9.1 Average survey 2025: 9.1

Judges rate the independence of Councils for the Judiciary lower than their own independence or that of all judges, although the score is still positive on average (7.0). See Figure 5. Two judiciaries score very low: Spain (3.4) and Bulgaria (4.3), while Hungary, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina score low (around 5.5). The highest scores are found in Ireland and the UK. When interpreting the results, attention should be paid to the fact that In the UK councils are essentially advisory bodies. In Ireland all judges are members of the council. It should be noted that in the absence of councils often ministries of Justice fulfil the tasks of a council wholly or in part (see the ENCJ indicators, indicator Independence 2, Organizational autonomy of the judiciary<sup>6</sup>). Ministries of Justice are by definition not independent. Still, it is beyond doubt that the mere presence of a Council for the Judiciary does not guarantee the independence of the judiciary. This depends very much on actual arrangements, in particular, with regard to the appointment of members of a Council, and on actual behaviour.

A related question concerns whether or not councils have appropriate mechanisms to protect judicial independence. See Figure 6. For reference, in the heading of this and the following figures the question (statement) posed in the survey is presented. Many respondents are uncertain about the mechanisms available to a Council (on average across countries 29% answer that they are unsure) or negative (23%), leaving 48% of the respondents believing councils have appropriate mechanisms. In Spain only 20% of the respondents and in Hungary 25% believe councils have appropriate mechanisms. The percentage for Hungary declined sharply (down from 35% in 2022). A decline also occurred in the Netherlands (from 44% to 24%). The difference between the two countries is that judges are less negative and much more uncertain in the Netherlands than in Hungary.

<sup>6</sup> ENCJ (2020). Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary; measuring for improvement, ENCJ report 2019-2020.




Figure 5 Independence of the Council for the Judiciary, scale 0 -10, where 0 means “not independent at all” and 10 means “highest possible degree of independence”<sup>7</sup>

Note: Average survey 2022: 6.9 Average survey 2025: 7.0

Italy and Greece have both two councils for the judiciary, one for the regular courts and one for the administrative courts. Table 1 gives the results for each council.

Table 1 Independence of the Council for the Judiciary and mechanisms of Councils for the judiciary to defend judicial independence for the two Councils for the Judiciary of Greece and Italy<sup>8</sup>

	Greece						Italy					
	Supreme Judicial Council of Civil and criminal justice			Supreme Council for Administrative Justice			Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura			Consiglio di Presidenza della Giustizia Amministrativa		
Score indep. of Council	5.6			8.1			6.5			7.6		
	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree
Mechanisms to protect independence	26%	39%	35%	59%	29%	12%	50%	16%	33%	66%	13%	21%

<sup>7</sup> The Ministry of Justice of Estonia has asked specifically to include Estonia in this Figure as well as in Figures 6 and 36. The ENCJ has not received a request for membership of the Network as yet.

<sup>8</sup> For Greece 65% of the respondents are from the regular courts and for Italy 60%.

In both countries, the council for the administrative courts is seen by the relevant respondents as more independent than the council for the regular courts. This is reflected in the views about the adequacy of the mechanisms of the council to protect independence.




Figure 6 Mechanisms of Councils for the judiciary to defend judicial independence

Note: Average survey 2022: 23% Average survey 2025: 24%

### 5. Implementation of judicial decisions

Independence cannot be separated from the authority of the judge.<sup>9</sup> When judicial decisions are not implemented, independence may be guaranteed in all respects to allow impartial judgments, but it has little practical value: independence presupposes that power resides in the judge. Implementation of judicial decisions can be seen as the complement of independence. In particular, governments have the ability to ignore judicial decisions or, at least, delay implementation. In the survey, judges were asked to give their assessment of the implementation by the government of judicial decisions that go against the interests of that government. As the high percentage of not-sure answers (mean across countries is 32%) indicates, this question is difficult to answer. On average across countries, only 43% of judges agree with the statement that judgments against the interests of the government are usually executed (Figure 7), down from 51% in 2022.<sup>10</sup> The variation between countries is very large. Percentages range from a meagre 6% in Bulgaria to around 77% in Ireland, Norway and Sweden. In Italy, a very large percentage of the respondents (55%) actually believes that such judgments are usually not implemented.

<sup>9</sup> J. Rios-Figueroa and J.K. Stanton (2012), An evaluation of cross-national measures of judicial independence, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 30/1 p 104-137.

<sup>10</sup> Excluding Moldova, Romania and Ukraine which did not participate in the 2022 survey, 45% of the respondents agreed with the statement in 2025.




Figure 7 Implementation by government of judgments against the interests of government

Note: Average survey 2022: 20% Average survey 2025: 24%

From Figure 7 can be concluded that the implementation of judicial decisions is an important issue which is increasing in relevance.

### 5.1 Perceptions of independence and implementation of decisions

If judicial independence, in the sense of autonomy, and implementation of judicial decisions by government together define the position of the judiciary in the trias politica, it is of interest how these two dimensions are related. In Figure 8 the independence score (for all judges) is depicted on the horizontal axis, while the implementation of judicial decisions by government is on the vertical axis. The correlation of both dimensions is strong (the correlation coefficient is 0.74). Still, in a variety of judiciaries, a relatively high score on independence is combined with a low score on implementation. Cyprus offers an example.




Figure 8 Judicial independence versus implementation of judicial decisions by government.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Austria: AT, Belgium: BE, Bosnia and Herzegovina: BA, Bulgaria: BG, Croatia: HR, Czechia: CZ, Denmark: DK, Germany: DE, England and Wales: EW, Greece: EL, Finland: FI, Hungary: HU, Ireland: IE, Italy: IT, Latvia: LV, Lithuania: LT, Moldova: MD, Montenegro: ME, Northern Ireland: NI, Netherlands: NL, Norway: NO, Portugal: PT, Romania: RO, Scotland: SC, Slovakia: SK, Slovenia: SI, Spain: ES, Sweden: SE, Ukraine: UA.

## 6. Independence in relation to the European Union

Across all judiciaries, 62% of the respondents believe that their independence has been strengthened by being part of the EU (and EEA) or the prospect of becoming part of the EU (*Figure 9*). In the Baltic states and Romania this belief is particularly strong. Relatively low scores are found in the Nordic countries, where more than in other judiciaries judges are uncertain of the impact of the EU. Obviously, in these judiciaries there may not be much to improve with respect to independence, but other factors may play a role as well. Since the previous survey, the outcomes have not changed much.




Figure 9 Influence of the European Union on judicial independence

Note: Average survey 2022: 12% Average survey 2025: 11%

## 7. Aspects of independence: case related

The vast majority of judges in Europe do not experience inappropriate pressure to influence their decisions (*Figure 10*). Across all countries, 6% of the judges report inappropriate pressure with less than 1% reporting that this happens regularly. Uncertainty does not play a role here (only 3% of answers is unsure). Percentages of respondents experiencing inappropriate pressure of 10% and higher are reported for Northern Ireland (14%) and Ukraine (12%). In both judiciaries, the most given answers as to who exerts this pressure are the parties and their lawyers. The fact that judges are under inappropriate pressure does not mean, of course, that they yield to that pressure.




Figure 10 Inappropriate pressure on judges

Note: Average survey 2022: 92% Average survey 2025: 91%

### 7.1 External pressure

Turning to external pressure more specifically, *Figure 11* concerns the occurrence of corruption in the judiciary, focused on efforts to influence the outcome of court cases. The question concerns the perceived prevalence of corruption within the judiciary and not personal experience of attempts of bribery. While on average across all judiciaries 9% of the respondents believe corruption occurs, only 1% believes this occurs regularly and 4.5% occasionally. The remaining 3.5% answers “very rarely”. Uncertainty plays a role, as 21% of the respondents are not sure. The spread among judiciaries is very large. In the previous surveys, three categories of countries were distinguished. The current data suggests four categories: (1) judiciaries in which nearly all judges (95% or more) are sure that corruption does not occur. Countries are Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the three judiciaries of the UK. (2) Judiciaries in which 75-94% are sure no corruption occurs. In these countries a small percentage of judges (10% or less) believes that corruption occurs and less than 20% is not sure. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany and Spain fall into this category. (3) Judiciaries in which 30-74% are sure that corruption does not occur. In these countries generally a higher percentage believes that corruption occurs (6% up to 39%) and also a higher percentage is not sure (15% up to 54%). (4) Judiciaries in which few judges believe no corruption occurs (less than 30%). The

countries concerned are Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia (all three judiciaries 29%) and Ukraine (14%). In these countries, judges report in varying degrees that corruption occurs regularly or occasionally (and thus not very rarely): Bosnia and Herzegovina (12%), Bulgaria (22%), Croatia (12%) and Ukraine 19%. It should be noted that also in Greece a substantial percentage of judges (15%) report this.




Figure 11 Judicial corruption

Note: Average survey 2022: 71% Average survey 2025: 74%

Compared with the 2022 survey, perceptions of corruption have become somewhat less frequent. See further Section 10.

The outcome of cases can be influenced by the case allocation. The allocation of specific cases to specific judges, if the allocation mechanism allows for discretionary decisions by, for instance, court management, can determine the outcome of these cases in foreseeable ways. This may be brought about by external pressure, and it is a potential inroad for corruption. In particular, many judges in Hungary (30%), Spain (22%) and Greece (17%) believe that case allocation is misused in their judiciaries, while also large percentages in these countries are not sure about this (Figure 12). The situation in Hungary has deteriorated since the previous survey. Across the rest of the judiciaries the situation did not change much.




Figure 12 Allocation of cases to judges

Note: Average survey 2022: 7% Average survey 2025: 6%

External pressure can also take the form of claims for personal liability. Figure 13 shows that, while not negligible, claims are not a big issue in the eyes of the respondents.




Figure 13 Personal liability

Note: Average survey 2022: 4% Average survey 2025: 4%

More important sources of external influence on decisions are the media and social media, according to the respondents. Many judges see an inappropriate impact on judicial decisions. What is to be understood by inappropriate, is left open in the survey. The impact of the media on decisions of judges is large in most countries. However, in the Nordic countries (Scandinavia and Finland), Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, under 10% of judges believes this impact exists (Figure 14). The highest percentages occur for Croatia (51%), Ukraine (48%), Slovakia (47%), Greece (40%) and Hungary (38%). The impact of social media on decisions is seen as inappropriate by less respondents (Figure 15). Across all judiciaries, the average is 12%, compared with 19% for the traditional media. However, in some countries, many judges see the influence as very large (40% in Ukraine, 34% in Slovakia and 30% in Croatia). The relationship with the (social) media is further discussed below.




Figure 14 Influence of the media on judicial decisions

Note: Average survey 2022: 19% Average survey 2025: 19%

While perceptions about media influence on decisions have remained the same, the impact of social media is slowly increasing.




Figure 15 Influence of social media on judicial decisions

Note: Average survey 2022: 11% Average survey 2025: 12%

Two new questions were added with regard to external pressure. These questions concern threats and intimidation of judges and actual violence against judges. Figure 16 shows that threats and intimidation are an issue in many judiciaries. While threats occur hardly regularly, occasional occurrence is quite common. In half of the judiciaries more than 10% of the judges experience intimidation or threats. These judiciaries vary from the UK, in particular Northern Ireland, to Norway, Hungary and Ukraine.

Physical attacks on judges are very rare. As a result Figure 17 is not particularly informative. Still, these attacks occur. Table 2 gives absolute numbers. These numbers are small, but each attack is one too many.




Figure 16 Occurrence of intimidation and threats by court users and others from outside the courts




Figure 17 Prevalence of physical attacks on judges by court users or others from outside the courts

Table 2 Physical attacks on judges by court users or others from outside the courts, absolute number of respondents reporting attacks

	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	No		Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	No
Austria	0	0	3	588	Lithuania	0	1	4	199
Belgium	1	2	14	429	Moldova	1	2	8	142
BiH	1	0	5	314	Montenegro	0	0	4	84
Bulgaria	0	1	6	507	Netherlands	0	2	2	656
Croatia	0	1	3	367	Norway	0	1	3	304
Cyprus	0	0	0	73	Portugal	1	4	1	980
Czech Rep.	0	0	2	286	Romania	2	4	8	1.281
Denmark	0	0	1	167	Slovakia	0	2	3	602
Estonia	0	0	2	78	Slovenia	0	0	4	172
Finland	0	0	2	290	Spain	4	3	15	1.052
France	1	29	122	1.879	Sweden	0	0	2	503
Germany	0	3	45	3.150	Ukraine	0	5	7	373
Greece	1	4	14	814	E&W	1	2	12	668
Hungary	1	1	2	1.010	NI	0	0	2	35
Ireland	0	2	4	128	Scotland	0	0	1	94
Italy	0	5	15	563					
Latvia	1	0	3	211	Total	15	74	319	17.999

7.2 Internal pressure

Turning to internal pressure, *Figure 18* presents the pressure judges experience when deciding cases as a result of (the threat of) disciplinary procedures. In most judiciaries, some respondents felt this pressure personally. Ukraine is an outlier, where 39% of the respondents answer that they have been affected. Moldova follows with 12%. In most judiciaries the percentage is between 5 and 10%. Disciplinary procedures are highly uncommon in countries like Denmark and the Netherlands and therefore cannot be expected to affect behaviour generally.




Figure 18 Disciplinary action

Note: Average survey 2022: 4% Average survey 2025: 5%

Table 3 Disciplinary action and promotion of judges, which are tasks of the two councils for the judiciary of Greece and Italy, as perceived by relevant respondents (disciplinary action has impact on my independence and promotion other than on the basis of ability and experience occurs)

	Greece						Italy					
	Supreme Judicial Council of Civil and criminal justice			Supreme Council for Administrative Justice			Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura			Consiglio di Presidenza della Giustizia Amministrativa		
	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree
Disciplinary action	14%	5%	81%	2%	4%	95%	9%	4%	88%	3%	2%	95%
First time appointment	21%	29%	50%	13%	21%	67%	7%	9%	83%	6%	14%	80%
Promotion of judges	33%	30%	37%	15%	24%	61%	59%	19%	22%	25%	23%	51%

As discussed earlier, Greece and Italy have separate councils for the courts of ordinary jurisdiction and the administrative courts. These councils have mandates concerning disciplinary procedures against judges and the appointment and promotion of judges (for the latter see section 8). Table 3 presents outcomes for both councils. Again, respondents are more positive about the administrative councils than the regular councils.

Above, inappropriate pressure on judges from diverse sources, including court management, was discussed. *Figures 19, 20 and 21* differentiate the influence of court management by examining separately the always inappropriate influence on the content of judicial decisions, inappropriate influence on the timeliness of decisions and inappropriate influence to reach productions targets. Influence on the content of decisions is rare. Except Scotland and Northern Ireland, 5% or less of the respondents actually report that such pressure has been exerted on them personally. The average percentage is 3% across countries. As to timeliness, pressure that is perceived to be inappropriate occurs much more often, on average 10%. For 14 judiciaries the percentage of judges that experience such inappropriate pressure is between 10% and 20%. Very low percentages are found in Denmark and the Netherlands as well as Romania, Moldova and Ukraine. Pressure that is considered inappropriate by the respondents is even higher with respect to production targets. The average across countries is 15%. Croatia, France, Hungary and Spain score well above 20%. Very low percentages are found in Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine as well as Denmark. In these judiciaries production targets do not seem to play a role, probably for diverse reasons.




Figure 19 Inappropriate pressure of court management: content of decisions

Note: Average survey 2022: 3% Average survey 2025: 3%




Figure 20 Inappropriate pressure of court management: timeliness

Note: Average survey 2022: 10% Average survey 2025: 11%




Figure 21 Inappropriate pressure of court management: production targets

Note: Average survey 2022: 16% Average survey 2025: 16%

Influence that is felt to be inappropriate may also be exerted among the judges themselves. In the survey, this is covered by a question concerning the impact of guidelines developed by judges. Note that such guidelines do not include the obligation to follow precedent. Guidelines that promote the uniform interpretation of (procedural) law may go against the professional opinion of individual judges, but they still may feel bound to comply. From the perspective of independence this is undesirable. Figure 22 shows that this tension is actually widespread in Central Europe, but also occurs, for instance, in England and Wales and, in particular, Scotland. In most other judiciaries more unanimity seems to exist about guidelines.




Figure 22 Impact of guidelines on independence

Note: Average survey 2022: 10% Average survey 2025: 11%

### 7.3 Internal and external pressure on adjudication

Figure 23 combines internal and external pressure. Inappropriate pressure to meet production targets is used as an indicator for internal pressure and improper media influence for external pressure. The correlation between the two variables is less than it was in 2022.<sup>12</sup> This is primarily caused by the responses of judges from Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine, where pressure to meet production targets is not regarded as an issue. In these countries other aspects of internal pressure play a role.

<sup>12</sup> Correlation coefficient was 0.65 in 2022 and is now 0.36 in 2025.



Figure 23 Degree of internal influence (no inappropriate pressure from production targets) vs degree of external influence on case handling (no improper influence of the media)

## 8. Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

Human resource decisions about judges form a key area of independence, and often belong to the primary tasks of a Council for the Judiciary. In the survey, a distinction is made between first appointment at the judiciary, appointment to the Supreme Court / Court of Cassation and promotion to other positions in the first and second instance courts. *Figures 24, 25 and 26* present the outcomes. *Figure 24* concerns the first appointment to the judiciary and addresses the issue of whether or not the appointment is solely based on ability and experience. Only in a few judiciaries more than 90% of the respondents believe appointments are only based on merit (Denmark, Netherlands and Northern Ireland) with few respondents being uncertain. In other judiciaries this belief does not exist, with at the extreme Hungary (only 23%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (24%). The percentage for Hungary decreased substantially since the last survey (40% in 2022), while it remained the same for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As to appointment to the Supreme Court / Court of Cassation, the percentages are worse for many judiciaries. Only 11% of the respondents from Hungary, 22% from Spain and 24% from Bosnia and Herzegovina express the view that these appointments are only based on ability and experience, but, for instance, also in Greece (36%), Germany (34%), Italy (43%) and Portugal (45%) percentages are low.

Promotion of judges at the first instance and appeal courts also draws more negative replies than first appointments (*Figure 26*). Only Denmark scores very favourably on this. Hungary jumps out negatively with 57% of the respondents believing that promotion is not only based on merit and a further 21% being uncertain. The results show that promotion is difficult to organise in such a way that it is only based on ability and experience, and that it is actually recognized as such by the judges. The point has been made in comments on previous surveys that negative opinions about promotion may be dominated or strengthened by judges that were not selected for promotion. While disgruntled response may play a role, this is likely to be relevant in particular where procedures are not perceived to be transparent and objective, and thus it does not detract from the relevance of the answers.

In this regard the situation is not getting worse since the previous survey. However, the outcomes show that appointment and promotion remain major issues to be addressed in nearly all judiciaries. As discussed, at country level notable changes occurred.




Figure 24 First appointment of judges

Note: Average survey 2022: 16% Average survey 2025: 17%




Figure 25 Appointment to supreme court/court of cassation

Note: Average survey 2022: 20% Average survey 2025: 19%




Figure 26 Promotion of judges

Note: Average survey 2022: 21% Average survey 2025: 21%

## 9. Aspects of independence: working conditions

The way judges are able to adjudicate cases also depends on their working conditions. Judges may be fully independent in the aspects described above, but if they, for instance, lack the time to conduct procedures in the manner they deem necessary for a fair trial, independence is severely diminished. In the survey the respondents were therefore asked to give their opinion on several aspects of potential changes in their working conditions. The following figures deal with six aspects: (1) pay, pension and retirement age, (2) working hours, (3) case load, (4) court resources, (5) digitalization and (6) conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination.

Pay, pensions and retirement age vary in importance from not an issue at all (Denmark, Netherlands) to a major issue. Hungary and Ukraine are extreme cases where, respectively, 73% and 69% of the respondents see it as a factor that affects their independence. Pay impacts independence in other judiciaries as well with percentages of 40% or more in a variety of countries, consisting of Belgium, Estonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Slovenia and Spain. It should be noted that problems in this area can be rapidly resolved if there is a will to do so. This occurred in Lithuania. In the previous survey 61% of the respondents answered that their independence was affected. This percentage dropped to 17% in the current survey. Compared to the previous survey, conflicts in this area are on the rise. On average across countries, the percentage of respondents whose independence is negatively affected increased from 17% to 21%.

Working hours are less of an issue, but it is very important in Spain (51%), followed by Belgium, France, Greece, Montenegro and Portugal.




Figure 27 Impact on independence of changes in working conditions: pay, pension and retirement age

Note: Average survey 2022: 17% Average survey 2025: 21%




Figure 28 Impact on independence of changes in working conditions: working hours

Note: Average survey 2022: 13% Average survey 2025: 17%




Figure 29 Impact on independence of changes in working conditions: case load

Note: Average survey 2022: 22% Average survey 2025: 27%




Figure 30 Impact on independence of change of working conditions: court resources

Note: Average survey 2022: 22% Average survey 2025: 27%

Caseload is a major issue affecting independence in many countries. On average across judiciaries 28% of the respondents think this is the case. Only in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands few judges see it that way. Court resources are a closely related issue. The outcomes are very similar. Again, the situation regarding caseload and court resources has substantially deteriorated since the previous survey.

In that survey, digitalization was added in response to the Covid 19 Pandemic. It is less of an issue than pay and workload, but still important. In 10 judiciaries, more than 20% of the respondents feel that digitalization affects their independence. This may stem from experience with applications judges have to work with, but also from lack of involvement of the judiciary in digitalization processes, implemented by ministries of Justice.

Finally, conduct at work (including sexual harassment and discrimination) is not recognized by many judges as a factor that influences independence. Still, it is mentioned, and in some judiciaries it is an important issue. In France, Greece, Hungary and Slovenia more than 10% of the respondents answer that their independence is affected.

The relative importance of the six factors constituting change in working conditions can be summarized by the average across judiciaries. This leads to the following ranking: 27% of the respondents see case load and court resources as having an impact on their independence (22% in 2022), 21% pay, pensions and retirement age (17% in 2022), 17% working hours (13% in 2022), 16% digitalization (15% in 2022) and 6% conduct at work (7% in 2022). From the survey, it can not be determined whether and how these aspects may accumulate. Still, working conditions are big issues and increasingly so.




Figure 31 Impact on independence of change in working conditions: digitalization

Note: Average survey 2022: 15% Average survey 2025: 16%




Figure 32 Impact on independence of change in working conditions: conduct at work, including sexual harassment and discrimination

Note: Average survey 2022: 7% Average survey 2025: 6%

## 10. Accountability

Figures 33, 34 and 35 address some important aspects of the accountability of the judiciary. The issues included in the survey are the adherence of judges to ethical standards and extent to which the judicial authorities address judicial misconduct and judicial corruption.

As to the behaviour of judges, the differences among judiciaries are relatively small. The average for all countries together is only 4% of respondents disagreeing with the proposition that judges adhere to high ethical standards, with a high percentages for Greece (14%). Relatively few respondents (on average 13%) are unsure about this, but in some judiciaries uncertainty is much larger (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Croatia, in particular).

With regard to the performance of the judicial authorities the outcomes are more negative and they differ much more among judiciaries. With regard to whether judicial misconduct is properly addressed, the average across all judiciaries is 11% of the respondents believing that the judicial authorities are not effective in addressing this issue, with much more respondents being uncertain (25%). For addressing corruption, the means are 8% (not effectively addressed) and 26% (uncertain).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Slovenia and Spain, 20% or more of the respondents feel that the authorities do not act appropriately to address judicial misconduct. As to the effectiveness of policies against corruption, the worst outcomes are found for again Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Croatia, followed by Greece, Montenegro and Slovakia.




Figure 33 Adherence by judges to ethical standards

Note: Average survey 2022: 5% Average survey 2025: 4%




Figure 34 Handling of judicial misconduct by judicial authorities

Note: Average survey 2022: 11% Average survey 2025: 11%




Figure 35 Handling of judicial corruption by judicial authorities

Note: Average survey 2022: 7% Average survey 2025: 8%

## 11. Perceived respect for judicial independence

The independence of judges is an important prerequisite for democracy based on the rule of law. The functioning of such a system depends very much on the effective interaction of the three state powers and, in particular, the respect they show for each others' roles. As to the judiciary this is foremost respect for the independence of the judiciary. The interaction of the state powers cannot be separated from the opinions of the citizens, in their role as voters but also as parties in judicial procedures. When citizens have the courts in high esteem, it is in the interest of parliament and government to act accordingly, and, for instance, to refrain from criticizing judges and to implement court decisions that conflict with the interests of government.<sup>13</sup> Also, the role of the traditional media and, increasingly, the social media cannot be neglected as intermediary of courts and citizens. In this section, the outcomes of questions on the perceptions of judges about the respect for judicial independence by a range of stakeholders are reported. These perceptions are based on direct experience of judges in the courts or, where direct interaction does not take place, on out of court observation of the behaviour of stakeholders. The stakeholders distinguished here are the judicial authorities, the parties in procedures and their legal representation, and the other state powers and the (social) media. The figures show that judges feel most respected by the judicial authorities and subsequently by the court users. Least positive and increasingly so are judges about the other state powers and the (social) media. This categorization is further discussed in Box 1.

### 11.1 Judicial authorities

The judicial authorities are defined here as the judicial governance bodies such as court management including the presidents of the courts, Councils for the Judiciary and the highest courts, consisting of the Supreme Courts and the Constitutional Courts. Also, the judges' associations are included. *Figures 36 - 40* present the outcomes. Respect for independence, as experienced by the judges, is generally high. This holds, in particular, for the highest courts, and to a somewhat lesser degree for the governance bodies. Councils for the Judiciary are seen as less respectful than the other bodies, but there are large differences among judiciaries, indicating that councils operate in different ways. While in Hungary, Spain and Ukraine 20% or more of the respondents feel that councils do not respect independence, in the other judiciaries this is much less of an issue if at all. In the mean, the experience of judges with court management is similar, but the spread among judiciaries is less than for the councils. For all institutions except Judges Associations, Hungary stands out as less respectful for independence. The appreciation of the Supreme Court is particularly low. In the view of the respondents, respect for independence has declined in Hungary. In particular, less respondents feel that their independence is respected by the Council for the Judiciary than in 2022 (from 72% in 2022 to 59% in 2025) and by the Supreme Court (from 76% to 45%).

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<sup>13</sup> See for instance J.N. Krehbiel (2021), Public awareness and the behavior of unpopular courts. *British Journal of Political Science* 51, 1601-1619.




Figure 36 Respect for judicial independence by Councils of the Judiciary

Note: Average survey 2022: 8% Average survey 2025: 8%

Table 4 differentiates the response for Greece and Italy for the two councils in these countries and gives the respect for judicial independence by these councils, as perceived by the judges of the courts of ordinary jurisdiction and by the judges of the administrative courts. To provide perspective, the perceived respect by government is also displayed. Respondents from the administrative courts feel more respected by their council than do respondents from the ordinary courts.

Table 4 Respect for judicial independence, as perceived by relevant respondents (regular and administrative judges), by the two councils of Greece and Italy and by government, percentages of judges that (dis)agrees with or is uncertain about the statement that judicial independence is respected

	Greece						Italy					
	Supreme Judicial Council of Civil and criminal justice			Supreme Council for Administrative Justice			Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura			Consiglio di Presidenza della Giustizia Amministrativa		
	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree	Agree	Not sure	Dis-agree
Respect by Council	67%	21%	12%	89%	7%	4%	79%	9%	12%	85%	8%	7%
Respect by government	38%	28%	35%	62%	23%	15%	27%	10%	62%	57%	15%	28%




Figure 37 Respect of judicial independence by court management

Note: Average survey 2022: 7% Average survey 2025: 8%




Figure 38 Respect of judicial independence by Associations of judges

Note: Average survey 2022: 4% Average survey 2025: 4%




Figure 39 Respect of judicial independence by supreme court/court of cassation

Note: Average survey 2022: 4% Average survey 2025: 5%




Figure 40 Respect of judicial independence by constitutional court

Note: Average survey 2022: 4% Average survey 2025: 7%

## 11.2 Parties and legal representation

In this category the parties in procedures, their lawyers, and, with regard to criminal procedures, the prosecutors are included (*Figures 41, 42 and 43*). On average, less respondents feel their independence respected by the parties than by the lawyers, and by the lawyers than by the prosecutors. In particular, prosecutors are seen to respect judicial independence. The figures on parties and lawyers show that relatively many respondents filled in that they were not sure. As a result, while disrespect is rather scarce, respect for independence is also not overwhelming.




Figure 41 Respect for judicial independence by parties in procedures

Note 1: Data missing for Latvia, Moldova and Romania due to differences of interpretation in translation

Note 2: Average survey 2022: 11% Average survey 2025: 11%




Figure 42 Respect for judicial independence by lawyers

Note: Average survey 2022: 9% Average survey 2025: 9%




Figure 43 Respect for judicial independence by prosecutors

Note: Average survey 2022: 5% Average survey 2025: 5%

### 11.3 Other state powers and (social) media

The next four figures (*Figures 44 - 47*) give the results for Government, Parliament, the media and the social media. Judges are much less positive about the respect for independence by these actors than above. On average for all countries, 51% (56% in 2022) of the respondents answer that their independence is respected by government and 29% (25% in 2022) that it is not. These results mask a very large variation among judiciaries. The figures speak for themselves. In Ukraine only 10% of the respondents feel respected by government, in Slovenia 18% and in Hungary this percentage declined to 20%. Low respect for independence is not confined to a specific region. For instance, in France only 37%, in Spain 30% and Scotland 34% of the respondents feel respected. The outcomes for Parliament are very similar, while the same holds for the media.

With regard to the social media, much more respondents are uncertain of the impact on independence. The percentage that does not feel their independence respected by the social media is the same as for the media (31%) on average across countries. As a result, even fewer respondents feel respect from the social media (33%) than from the media (46%).

### 11.4 Differences among categories

Respect for independence is, in the eyes of the respondents, highest among the court authorities, followed by the parties and their representatives and, at a large distance, the other state powers and the (social) media.

Assuming, as was also suggested in the previous survey, that in a democracy the attitude of parliament and government is determined or at least influenced by the will of the people, one could, theoretically, expect that respect for independence by the parties in procedures would not differ much from respect by parliament and government. However, there is often a very large difference between the two, at least in the perception of the judges. An example of a judiciary where the differences are small is Denmark (98% of the respondents feel respected by the parties in procedures and 92% by government). These percentages are very high, even compared with the other Nordic countries. In Norway (84% of the respondents feels respected by the parties in procedures and 90% by government) and in Finland 86% and 77%. The Netherlands shows that change can be quick. In the previous survey, 74% of the judges felt their independence respected by government. Currently, only 51% feels respected, while respect by the litigants remained the same (88% in 2022 and 86% in 2025). Perceived respect by parliament was already relatively low, but declined further from 56% to 41%. In the case of the Netherlands, the parliamentary elections of 2023 seem to have played a significant role. Other judiciaries show extreme differences as well. For instance, France (71%, 37%), Spain (81%, 30%), Slovenia (60%, 18%) and England and Wales (72%, 38%). For Hungary the outcomes differ to a very large extent (79%, 20%).

In the Box, the correspondences of the perceptions of respect for independence by the different actors are examined. This report is not the place to examine the causes of these divergences, but it seems safe to conclude that the court and political “arenas” are quite different, and need to be reconciled. Where citizens in their role as parties in procedures respect the independence of the judiciary, a responsive government should do the same.




Figure 44 Respect for judicial independence by government

Note: Average survey 2022: 25% Average survey 2025: 27%




Figure 45 Respect for judicial independence by parliament

Note: Average survey 2022: 23% Average survey 2025: 26%




Figure 46 Respect for judicial independence by the media

Note: Average survey 2022: 28% Average survey 2025: 29%




Figure 47 Respect for judicial independence by social media


Note: Average survey 2022: 27% Average survey 2025: 30%

BOX: Mapping “respect” for judicial independence

The survey provides rich data on judges’ perceptions of “respect” paid to their independence by various stakeholders (groups and institutions) in the countries covered.<sup>14</sup> In the Report summarizing the results of the 2022 ENCJ survey of judges, a data dimensionality reduction technique, called Principal Components Analysis (PCA), was applied, in order to draw “maps” grouping stakeholders according to the perceptions of the responding judges. This box repeats the PCA analysis for the six jurisdictions covered in the 2022 Report (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Spain), using data collected in the 2025 edition of the survey. Moreover, it includes Ukraine and Norway, covering different institutional designs, legal traditions and perceived threats to judicial independence. As PCA is just a technique aimed at uncovering patterns from the data, obtained results require interpretation, which could be more of an art than a science. Nevertheless, it conveys important knowledge of the sources of both respect for and challenges to judicial independence, and their changes in recent years.

As in 2022, the results are summarized as “maps” presenting the various stakeholders covered in the survey. The location of each stakeholder was determined by the PCA analysis (see details in Annex 2). Stakeholders, that are assessed by a majority of judges as “respecting” judicial independence, are represented by green bubbles (the size of the bubble denotes the share of judges that view the institution as “respecting” their independence). Stakeholders, that are assessed by a majority of judges as “not respecting” judicial independence, are represented by red bubbles (the size of the bubble denotes the share of judges that see the institution as not “respecting” independence).


The 2022 and 2025 “maps” produced by PCA can differ in various ways. Some of them are just statistical artifacts (rotation of the whole “map”, with relatively stable groups of institutions – see the example of France and the Netherlands), but some are reflecting changes in the perception of the responding judges (movement of specific institutions from one neighborhood to another – see the examples of Hungary and Spain).



<sup>14</sup> Specifically, the relevant statement is phrased as follows: “During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by”, with a baseline list of 12 stakeholders: Association of Judges; Constitutional Court; Council for the Judiciary; Court Management including Court President; Government; Lawyers; Media (i.e. press, television or radio); Parliament; Parties; Prosecution; Social Media (for example Facebook, X or LinkedIn); Supreme Court.

<p>A bubble chart representing stakeholder relationships in France. The bubbles are arranged in three main clusters. The top-left cluster (red) includes Government, Parliament, Social Media, and Media. The top-right cluster (green) includes Constitutional Court, NCJ, Supreme Court, and Association. The bottom cluster (green) includes Court management, Prosecution, Lawyers, and Parties.</p>	<p>France:  Also in the case of France the “map” reveals clear clusters, and the general pattern is similar to that in 2022, albeit it is rotated along the vertical axis. First, stakeholders present in the courtroom (Parties, Lawyers, Prosecution) and Court Management. Second, Judicial institutions (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, NCJ, Association of Judges). Majorities of judges view them as respecting their independence. The third cluster groups political and media institutions. Noteworthy, while a majority of judges views the media, social media and the government as not respecting their independence, the opposite is true for Parliament (in 2022, a majority of judges perceived parliament as not respecting their independence).</p>
<p>A bubble chart representing stakeholder relationships in Germany. The bubbles are arranged in two main clusters. The top cluster (green) includes Parties, Lawyers, Prosecution, Association, Social Media, and Media. The bottom cluster (green) includes Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Court management, Parliament, and Government.</p>	<p>Germany:  The “map” plots a constellation of stakeholders somehow similar to the 2022 (albeit rotated along the vertical axis). Those directly linked to adjudication can be classified as a group, with the Prosecution between the Parties and Lawyers and the judicial Institutions (including the Association of judges). Importantly, the vast majority of judges assess all of them as respecting their independence. Court management moved away from this group (as compared with 2022), and is close to the political actors (Parliament and Government). At some distance from political actors, there are the Media and Social media. Noteworthy, a majority of judges assess also this cluster of institutions as respecting their independence (with the biggest share of pessimists around the Social Media).</p>
<p>A bubble chart representing stakeholder relationships in Hungary. The bubbles are arranged in two main clusters. The top cluster (green) includes Court management, NCJ, Constitutional Court, Association, Prosecution, Lawyers, and Parties. The bottom cluster (red) includes Supreme Court, Parliament, and Government. Social Media and Media are positioned between the two clusters.</p>	<p>Hungary:  Compared to 2022, substantial reshuffling occurred in the “Map” generated by the responses of Hungarian judges. NCJ – in 2022 located closely to the Association of judges, and at a distance from other judicial actors - moved towards Court Management, Supreme Court and Constitutional Court. The latter two institutions are close to Government and Parliament. Both – contrary to the 2022 survey - are viewed by the majority of judges as not respecting their independence. The Association of judges remained at some distance. Prosecution landed between judicial institutions and the Parties and Lawyers. Media are between parties appearing in the courtroom and the political actors and like in 2022 the majority of responding judges assessed them as not respecting their independence.</p>

	<p>Netherlands:</p> <p>Despite the rotation, the 2025 “map” for the Netherlands broadly resembles the 2022 map. It groups, first, stakeholders appearing in the courtroom (Parties, Lawyers and Prosecution). The Supreme Court is part of this cluster. Second, NCJ, Court Management and Association of judges and third – again at some distance - media and political institutions. Just as in the case of Germany, the majority of judges assess all stakeholders as respectful of their independence, with the biggest scepticism towards Social Media. The respect shown by the political actors is shrinking, in the view of the respondents.</p>
	<p>Norway:</p> <p>The “map” plots a large cluster of diverse institutions – including stakeholders appearing in the courtroom (Parties, Lawyers, Prosecution), judicial institutions (Supreme Court, Association of judges) as well as political institutions (Parliament and Government) and Media. NCJ and Court management landed in some distance. Also, contrary to the other analyzed jurisdictions, social media turned out at substantial distance from the traditional media. Importantly, just like in the case of Germany and the Netherlands, the majority of judges assess all stakeholders as respectful of their independence (with extraordinarily good assessments of Media and Social Media).</p>
	<p>Spain:</p> <p>As compared to 2022, substantial reshuffling occurred in the “map” drawn using Spanish judges responses. First, a majority of judges assess that the cluster of political and media institutions are not respecting their independence (back in 2022 that was the case only with the Media). Second, the Constitutional Court moved from the group of judicial institutions towards the political and media group. Although the majority of judges assess it as respectful towards their independence, there is more skepticism towards the Constitutional Court as compared to other judicial institutions and stakeholders present in the courtroom. Other actors remained in similar positions as in 2022, and the majority of judges assessed them as respectful towards their independence.</p>



Ukraine:  
 Despite the exceptionally difficult situation of the Ukrainian judges, administering justice during a war, the “map” drawn using their responses looks quite typical. Three clusters emerged – the political and media institutions (the majority of judges assess them as not respectful towards their independence), stakeholders appearing in the courtroom (Parties, Lawyers and Prosecution – judges disagree over the respect they pay towards their independence) and judicial institutions (NCJ, Supreme Court and Constitutional Court). Between these two groups, fell Court Management (with exceptionally high assessment in terms of respect towards judicial independence) and the Association of Judges.

## 12. Change over time of judicial independence

As the survey has been held five times, a comparison of judicial independence can be made over time since 2015. *Figure 48a* shows the average across all countries that participated, while *Figure 48b* restricts the average to judiciaries that participated at least three times in the survey. The survey in 2015 had a lower participation (number of judiciaries and number of judges) than the subsequent surveys. Thus, *Figure 48b* provides a more precise insight. The changes in the averages are relatively small. Both figures show that the gradual, upward trend of the independence score has stopped, in the view of the responding judges.




Figure 48 Independence of all judges (orange) and personal independence (blue), scale 0 – 10, average of judiciaries.

Figure 49 presents the independence scores per judiciary. As not all countries participated in each survey, there are gaps in the data. The outcomes show distinct patterns. The discussion here is confined to the perceived independence of all judges in a judiciary. Some judiciaries such as those of the Nordic countries, Austria and the Netherlands (a small decline occurred in the current survey) have a stable, high level of independence. Stability at a low level occurs in Bosnia and Herzegovina since first participation in 2019, while Italy also shows little change.

Other judiciaries show gradual improvements. A consistent gradual increase took place in Spain from a low score of 6.6 in 2015 to 8.0 in 2025. A similar development took place in France, albeit over a shorter period of time (7.6 in 2017 to 8.5 in 2025). Disregarding the survey of 2022 for Slovakia which had a very low response rate, the independence score of Slovakia increased from 6.7 in 2015 to 8.2 in 2025. Slower upward trends are observable in England and Wales, Germany and Ireland from already high starting levels. Slow upward trends also occur in Bulgaria, Croatia and Estonia.

Other judiciaries show less consistency. Portugal is a case in point, where the score declined from 8.1 in 2015 to 7.5 in 2019 and since then increased to 8.6 in 2025. A similar pattern is seen in Romania: a decline until 2019 from 8.7 to 7.9 and an increase to 8.8 in 2025. After lackluster performance for many years, substantial improvements of the score occurred in Lithuania from 7.5 in 2022 to 8.3 in 2025 and in Latvia from 7.2 in 2019 to 7.8 in 2025.

Hungary participates since 2019 in the survey. After an initial increase, a sharp decline of the independence score occurred in 2025 (from 8.1 to 7.0). This is in line with negative developments in other survey answers. Montenegro participated in all surveys. Since 2019, the score declines and it is now 6.8. Greece participates since 2019 in the survey.<sup>15</sup> Its score has declined recently from 8.2 to 7.6. Slovenia's score seems to decline very gradually, from 7.9 in 2015 to 7.5 in 2025.

<sup>15</sup> In Greece the judges of the administrative courts reported a somewhat smaller decline than the other judges (from 8.4 to 8.1 versus 7.9 to 7.4, not correcting for differences in participation of both groups of judges).



Figure 49 Independence of all judges (orange) and personal independence (blue), scale 0 – 10, average per judiciary




Figure 49 Continued Independence of all judges (orange) and personal independence (blue), scale 0 – 10, average per judiciary

It can be concluded that in most judiciaries perceived independence remained high or improved since the start of the survey. However, in some judiciaries the respondents see declines. This is obviously the case in Hungary, but also in Montenegro and Greece declines occurred and to lesser extent in Slovenia.

Taking a longer perspective, judges were asked in the survey whether their independence has increased or decreased since they started working as a judge. These answers can be meaningfully combined with the years of experience judges have (see below Figure 53). Figure 50 presents the outcomes for all judiciaries together. It gives the percentage of respondents that experienced a large improvement or large decline of their independence, broken down for years of experience. This means that in this figure respondents that experienced small or no changes are not visible. The gradual improvement of independence since 2015 is visible in the experience of judges appointed in the last ten years. Judges that started more than 25 years ago report a (net) strong improvement of independence. The experience

of judges with in-between appointments suggests that the progression of independence is not linear. At aggregate level, the outcomes are much the same as those in the previous survey.




Figure 50 Change of independence since start as a judge by years of experience; average of all judiciaries. Percentage of respondents that report that their independence has improved or declined much.

Figure 51 gives the results for each judiciary separately. At the national level, most judiciaries show the largest improvements for both the judges with the longest and the shortest experience. For a substantial number of judiciaries, the outcomes differ from those of the previous survey. Most judiciaries have seen a development for the good, according to this way of measuring, in the sense that (much) more respondents report that their independence has increased strongly than those who report that it has declined strongly. A net negative development is reported for Belgium, Hungary, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine and Northern Ireland, in contrast to the findings of the previous survey for most of these countries.

The large differences between this survey and the previous survey indicate that recent experience has a large impact on the evaluation made by the respondents. It is very likely that this leads to an overemphasis of recent positive or negative experiences. This is a matter for further research, in particular at the national level. **Consequently, this measure should not be viewed in isolation, but in combination with the measures presented earlier. More weight should be given to the comparison of the surveys above.**





Figure 51 Continued Change of independence since start as a judge by years of experience for each judiciary, percentage of respondents that report that their independence has improved or declined much

### 13. Characteristics of respondents

The survey contained some questions about the personal and professional characteristics of the respondents. The previous surveys have shown that judges are a homogenous group and that, consequently, the differences in their replies are generally small and not significant. *Figures 52 -56* speak for themselves.




Figure 52 Gender of respondents

Note: 19 respondents answered “identify otherwise” and 261 “I do not wish to answer the question”.




Figure 53 Length of judicial experience of respondents




Figure 54 Respondents by type of court




Figure 55 Respondents by type of case they primarily adjudicate




Figure 56 Respondents by membership of a Judges' association

The above figures show that differences exist among the judiciaries in the participation rates of groups of respondents. The most striking differences occur in the types of cases adjudicated (*Figure 55*) due to systematic differences in the degree of specialisation in areas of law. In Denmark and Norway nearly all

judges adjudicate all types of cases, but also in Finland, Sweden, Greece, Ireland and parts of the UK many judges are generalists, while in the other judiciaries most judges handle a certain type of cases. Also, large differences occur with respect to administrative law. Finally, countries differ in the role played by judges' associations.

Whether it has added value to present the outcomes per category of the characteristics instead of totals, and/or to weigh the totals with participation rates of categories, depends on the differences between the outcomes for the categories of characteristics. In the Annex, the outcomes per characteristic are presented for the ratings of personal independence and the independence of the judges in general. The tables show that differences are small. In a previous survey, this was discussed and the results of statistical tests were given. As now, small differences were found that were generally not significant, and only un-weighted outcomes for all judges together were presented. In this report, the same approach is followed.

## 14. Conclusions

Most judiciaries of Europe and many judges participated in the survey. For the first time, Ukraine and Moldova took part. Due to the decentralized nature of the judiciary, it requires substantial effort to bring the survey to the attention of all judges. The degree of success with this has a large influence on the response rate. Most judiciaries were successful in reaching the judges. The survey gives an indepth insight into how the judges of all participating judiciaries perceive their independence, based on their, often long, experience. It should be noted that per judiciary the respondents generally hold similar views, irrespective of their personal and professional characteristics.

The report presents the outcomes of the survey without further quantitative analysis. An exception is made for the perceptions of judges about the respect for independence by a range of actors. The Box in section 11 contains an analysis of the "distance" between these actors, giving rise to three clusters: (1) the judicial authorities, (2) the parties in procedures, including lawyers and prosecutors and (3) the other state powers and the (social) media. In the view of the respondents, the judicial authorities highly respect judicial independence, the parties less so and the other state powers and media considerably less. This division is reflected in many of the answers to the survey questions.

The main findings are:

1. Judges generally evaluate their independence positively. On a 10-point scale, judges rate the independence of the judges in their country on average between 5.9 and 9.8 with the lowest score for Ukraine, followed by Montenegro (6.8), Hungary (7.0), Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina (both 7.1). The scores of ten judiciaries are 9 or higher. The respondents rate their personal independence even higher: between 6.8 and 9.9. Consistent with the positive assessment of independence, few judges report inappropriate pressure to influence judicial decisions.
2. Since 2015, when the first survey took place, independence has gradually improved on average for all judiciaries together. However, this trend comes to a halt in this survey, where depending on the yardstick the average score across countries remained the same or declined somewhat since the previous survey. Based on the experience of judges who have been working for many years, independence has improved over a longer period.
3. Examining the judiciaries individually, in most of them perceived independence remained high or improved since the first survey. However, in some judiciaries the respondents see declines. This is the case in Hungary which participated for the first time in 2019, but also in Montenegro and Greece (foremost civil and criminal courts) declines occurred and to a lesser extent in Slovenia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the independence score is stable at a low level.

4. Judges rate the independence of councils for the judiciary on average per country between 3.4 and 9.7. The councils of Spain and Bulgaria are awarded very low scores, while the scores for Hungary, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina are low. Scores above 8 are found in Finland, Ireland, Romania and the UK. Having a council is not enough to guarantee judicial independence. This depends highly on the arrangements, for instance, with regard to the appointment of the members of a council, but it depends also the way they act once elected or appointed as members of the council.
5. The issues that have been raised in the previous surveys continue to exist. In many judiciaries, judges are critical about human resource decisions concerning judges and, in particular, about appointment and promotion. In the view of respondents, also appointment to the Supreme Court/Court of Cassation remains problematic in a variety of countries.
6. Corruption remains an issue in several judiciaries. In a wider range of judiciaries, the judicial authorities are seen as not doing enough to address judicial misconduct and corruption.
7. Court management including the court presidents generally do not try to influence the content of judicial decisions. Some judges experience, however, inappropriate pressure by court management to meet timeliness standards, and more judges experience inappropriate pressure from production targets.
8. The tensions between the judiciary and the other state powers are also not a new issue, but the difficulties have increased in many respects. The survey highlights in particular: (1) lack of implementation by governments of judicial decisions that go against the interest of government has increased, (2) working conditions are increasingly becoming a threat to independence, in particular the low/lagging remuneration of judges and high workload/insufficient court resources and (3) lack of respect for judicial independence by government and parliament is in many countries a large and increasing issue, according to the respondents.
9. In most judiciaries, judges feel inappropriate pressure from the (social) media at case level. Many of them feel that their independence is not respected by/on the (social) media.
10. For the first time, the survey looked into intimidation and threats as well as actual attacks on judges. In half of the judiciaries more than 10% of the judges experience intimidation or threats. These judiciaries vary from the UK, in particular Northern Ireland, to Norway, Hungary and Ukraine. While threats occur hardly regularly, occasional occurrence is quite common. Physical attacks on judges are rare.

Most of the judges in Europe are positive about their independence, but they identify issues that affect their independence negatively. Some of these issues are at case level, others at system level, such as appointments. The survey provides many insights into the functioning of the judiciary at national level. It is up to the Councils for the Judiciary and other governing bodies to analyse the outcomes for their judiciaries and address the issues that are raised by the respondents. While Councils are dependent on the other state powers for improvement of legislation and for adequate resources, judiciaries and in particular Councils can address many issues by themselves. Still, the problems are increasing with the other state powers, and more respect for independence is necessary.

Most of the issues raised in the survey are not new, and require higher priority to resolve. In addition, the dialogue must be sought or continued with the other state powers and also with the media to promote a better understanding of the importance of judicial independence for the functioning of society and its economy. At the same time, it is advisable to increase the resilience of judges and governing institutions of the judiciary in the face of mounting tensions and threats. The dataset of the survey is available on request.

## Annex 1 Independence by characteristic

Table A1: Independence score of judges by characteristics, with a minimum of 20 respondents per judiciary.

Country	Gender		Judicial experience					Type of court			Type of cases			Member of Judges Association			
	Female	Male 65+ years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	Over 25 years	Count of first instance	Appellate court	Supreme Court of Cassation	administrative	including family	civil	criminal	civil and criminal in equal measure	administrative	Yes
Austria	9.0	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.9	8.3	8.8	8.1	8.2	-	-	8.0	8.8
Belgium	8.4	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.5	8.7	-	-	8.5	8.5	8.5	-	8.5	8.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.1	7.3	7.0	7.1	7.0	7.3	-	-	7.1	7.2	8.8	-	7.1	7.1
Bulgaria	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.4	7.2	7.8	7.1	8.8	7.4	7.4	7.9	7.4	8.8	-	-	7.8	8.8
Croatia	7.4	7.7	7.0	7.7	7.5	7.4	7.8	7.4	7.9	-	-	7.8	7.3	-	-	8.2	-
Cyprus	6.1	6.5	6.3	-	-	-	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.8	8.8
Czech Republic	8.8	8.8	-	-	-	8.4	8.8	8.8	8.9	-	-	8.8	-	-	-	8.8	8.8
Denmark	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.7	-	-	8.8	8.8	8.8	-	-	8.8	-	-	-	8.8	8.8
Estonia	8.8	-	-	-	-	-	8.8	-	-	-	-	8.8	-	-	-	8.8	-
Finland	8.0	8.4	8.2	8.2	8.5	8.8	-	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.2	8.4	-	8.3	8.4
France	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.3	8.5	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.8	8.4	8.5	8.3	8.8	8.4	8.5
Germany	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.7
Greece	7.8	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	8.1	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8
Hungary	7.0	7.2	6.8	7.3	6.9	7.3	6.8	7.8	8.8	7.2	7.1	8.5	7.2	-	-	8.8	7.1
Ireland	8.7	8.4	8.7	8.5	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	8.5	8.7	-	-	8.8	-
Italy	8.4	8.5	8.3	8.5	8.1	8.3	8.6	8.5	8.4	8.5	-	8.6	8.3	8.2	-	8.8	8.4
Latvia	7.8	7.8	8.4	-	7.8	-	7.7	7.8	8.0	8.0	-	8.2	7.8	7.8	-	8.1	7.8
Lithuania	8.0	8.5	7.8	8.1	8.8	8.1	8.8	8.8	8.7	-	-	8.2	8.8	-	-	8.5	8.8
Malta	7.8	7.7	8.1	7.8	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	-	7.8	7.8	-	-	7.8	8.8
Netherlands	7.1	6.5	6.4	-	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	-	-	7.8	-	-	8.8	-
Norway	8.0	8.0	8.8	8.2	8.8	8.8	8.2	8.2	8.8	8.1	-	8.7	8.8	-	-	8.8	8.1
Poland	8.0	8.2	8.2	8.5	8.2	8.1	-	8.2	8.3	-	-	8.1	8.8	-	-	8.3	8.3
Portugal	8.8	8.7	8.3	8.5	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.7	-	-	8.8	8.8	8.8	-	8.8	8.8
Romania	8.8	8.8	8.5	8.8	8.0	8.3	8.2	8.7	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.1	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.8
Slovakia	8.5	8.8	8.1	8.2	8.4	8.2	8.4	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.3	7.8	-	8.2	8.2
Slovenia	7.8	7.8	7.2	-	7.1	-	8.2	7.3	8.1	-	-	7.4	8.1	-	-	7.5	7.8
Spain	8.1	8.1	7.8	7.8	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.6	8.3	-	7.8	8.2	8.1	7.8	8.8	8.1
Sweden	8.8	8.5	8.7	8.6	8.2	8.8	8.7	8.5	8.3	-	-	8.4	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.5
Ukraine	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.4	6.1	5.4	5.4	-	5.8	5.8
United Kingdom - England and Wales	8.5	8.8	8.8	8.5	8.4	-	8.4	-	8.8	8.8	-	8.4	8.8	-	-	8.8	8.8
United Kingdom - Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.4	-	-	-	-	8.4	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom - Scotland	8.8	8.2	8.0	-	-	-	8.1	-	-	-	-	8.1	-	-	-	8.1	-
Country average	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3

Table A2 My independence score by characteristic, with a minimum of 20 respondents per judiciary

Country	Gender		Judicial experience					Type of court				Type of cases				Member of Judges Association		
	Female		6-99 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	Over 25 years	Court of first instance	Appel court	Supreme Court/ Court of Cassation	administrative cases	(including family) civil cases	criminal cases	criminal and civil cases in equal measure	administrative and criminal cases in equal measure	civil, criminal and administrative cases in equal measure	Yes	No
Austria	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.2	0.4	0.6	-	-	0.4	0.9	
Belgium	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	-	-	0.1	0.9	0.2	-	0.2	0.0	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.6	-	-	0.6	0.4	-	-	0.2	0.4	
Bulgaria	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.2	0.7	0.8	-	0.4	0.8	0.9	
Croatia	0.5	0.7	0.3	-	0.9	0.1	0.9	0.9	-	-	-	0.7	0.4	-	-	0.8	0.2	
Cyprus	0.7	0.5	0.7	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	
Czech Republic	0.4	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.9	
Denmark	0.8	0.9	0.8	10.0	0.7	-	-	0.9	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.9	-	
Estonia	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	
Finland	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.6	-	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.9	
France	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.9	
Germany	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.8	-	0.1	0.9	
Greece	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.5	-	
Hungary	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.7	-	-	0.3	0.6	-	-	0.4	0.5	
Ireland	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.7	-	-	0.7	-	
Italy	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.2	-	0.5	0.2	0.0	-	0.2	0.4	
Latvia	0.3	0.8	0.7	-	0.2	-	0.3	0.9	0.8	-	-	0.6	0.6	0.1	-	0.5	0.8	
Lithuania	0.9	0.0	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.5	-	0.2	0.7	0.1	-	0.9	0.5	-	-	0.8	0.7	
Maldives	0.9	0.8	0.2	0.6	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	0.8	0.4	0.1	
Montenegro	0.2	0.7	0.5	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	0.0	-	
Netherlands	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	-	-	0.4	0.3	-	-	0.3	0.4	
Norway	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	-	0.3	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.4	0.4	-	
Portugal	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.9	-	0.3	0.4	0.2	-	0.3	0.1	
Romania	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.8	-	-	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.4	
Slovakia	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	-	0.3	0.3	
Slovenia	0.2	0.2	0.9	-	0.9	-	0.7	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.2	0.7	-	-	0.2	0.3	
Spain	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.4	-	0.2	0.3	0.3	-	0.2	0.4	
Sweden	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.0	-	-	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	
Ukraine	0.8	0.9	0.4	-	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.9	-	-	0.1	0.0	0.2	-	0.8	0.8	
United Kingdom: England and Wales	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.4	-	0.5	0.7	-	-	0.4	0.6	-	-	0.6	0.5	
United Kingdom: Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
United Kingdom: Scotland	0.0	0.3	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	
Country average	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.9	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.8	

## Annex 2 Mapping “respect” for judicial independence

### Annex 2 Mapping “respect” for judicial independence

This appendix aims at outlining the methodology behind the “maps” presented in the Box: Mapping „respect” for judicial independence.

#### The Data

The departure point is the description of the data. The data consists of individual-level responses to the Statement: “During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by:”. Respondents were provided with a baseline list of 12 stakeholders: including state institutions (both judicial, like Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, and non-judicial like Prosecution, Parliament and Government), Media (traditional and social) and groups like parties and lawyers appearing before the courts.<sup>16</sup> To accommodate differences in the institutional design of countries covered by the Survey, the answer “does not exist” had been added (like Council of the Judiciary in Germany or Constitutional Court in the Netherlands and Norway). Responses have been transformed to the numerical scale, with agreement coded as positive values, disagreement as negative values and “not sure” – as neutral.<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, due to the data requirements of PCA (only responses covering all stakeholders could be applied), a substantial number of observations was dropped.

As a result, the analysis has been performed only on countries with a sufficiently large number of workable observations. The overall number of responses – as well as number of responses covering all stakeholders applicable in a given jurisdiction (thereby workable for PCA) are listed in the table 1. Percentages of judges viewing specific stakeholders as “respecting” or “not respecting” their independence in the whole surveyed sample and in the subsample applied in PCA turned out roughly equal. Thereby, no systemic bias was introduced by lost observations.

	Overall number of responses	Workable observations for PCA
Bulgaria	528	432
France	2121	1632
Germany	3369	2553
Hungary	1031	968
Netherlands	670	341
Norway	313	271
Spain	1113	783
Ukraine	431	334
<i>Source: Own compilation</i>		

#### The Method

Principal Components Analysis (PCA) synthesizes information from a large set of variables into a smaller set of so called Principal Components. Thus, it reduces redundant information (for example, a sequence of individual assessments of similarly perceived institutions into just one aggregate) or uncovers some

<sup>16</sup> Full list – in original ordering - includes: Association of Judges; Constitutional Court; Council for the Judiciary; Court Management incl Court President; Government; Lawyers; Media (i.e. press, television or radio); Parliament; Parties; Prosecution; Social Media (for example Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn); Supreme Court.

<sup>17</sup> I.e. Strongly agree (+2), Agree (+1), Not sure (0), Disagree (-1), Strongly disagree (-2).

unobservable (latent) factor (like personality trait, uncovered from the battery of questions in a personality test). Doing that, the PCA algorithm calculates so called factor loadings. These indicate how a given variable<sup>18</sup> contributes to the subsequent Principal Components (the larger absolute value of the loading, the higher proportion of the variable’s variance is explained by a given component). Using factor loadings in two selected components, one can present the variables that are analyzed in a space defined by these two components (i.e. components define vertical and horizontal axis, and variables are represented as points on the scatterplot).

As PCA is just a data dimensionality reduction technique, obtained components (and factor loadings) reflects nothing more than the patterns recovered from the data. In order to give sense to the components (provide labels to the vertical and horizontal axis) they need to be interpreted, which is sometimes difficult and introduces a degree of subjectivity.

**Results**

Across the selected countries, the PCA analysis of the responses to the statement<sup>19</sup> revealed that the first principal component explains nearly half of the overall variance (in case of Norway – 72%, see table 2), with broadly similar loadings from all stakeholders. That in turn suggests the existence of some unobservable, individual-level characteristic linked to the way a given respondent perceives “respect” for his or her independence in general.

However, second and third components, together explaining an additional quarter of the overall variance, allowed for clear differentiation of stakeholders. Thereby, respective factor loadings were applied to draw the “maps” presented in the Box.

Table 2: Percentage of the overall variance explained by the first three principal components (PCs)

	PC1	PC2 (horizontal axis on the “maps”)	PC3 (vertical axis on the “maps”)
Bulgaria	58%	12%	7%
France	48%	19%	7%
Germany	53%	13%	6%
Hungary	45%	12%	10%
Netherlands	46%	15%	9%
Norway	72%	8%	5%
Spain	51%	16%	8%
Ukraine	40%	15%	13%

Source: Own compilation

**Interpretation**

One way to interpret PCA results is to examine the factor loadings of various stakeholders in subsequent principal components. Knowing which variable contributes the most to a given component (with either positive or negative sign) one could try to label the component in a meaningful way. Then, two components could be used as axes on the presented “maps”. For example, the horizontal axis could be interpreted as an ordering of stakeholders from non-judicial to the judicial actors – while the vertical axis could be interpreted as representing a move from the courtroom towards the justice system as a whole. Nevertheless, such storytelling remains more of an art than a science. First, it introduces

<sup>18</sup> From the original, large data set.

<sup>19</sup> In other words, 12 variables, each of them representing individual responses of the judges, rating “respect” of a given stakeholder to one’s independence, with individual answers coded on +2,+1,0,-1,-2 scale. If given institution does not exist in a specific country (Council of the Judiciary in Germany and Constitutional Court in Netherlands and Norway) 11 of variables were analyzed.

substantial subjectivity. Second, as the analysis is carried out separately for each country, resulting labels could also differ from country to country. Here, we deliberately refrained from interpreting and labelling (or even plotting) axes on the presented maps. Instead, we focused only on the location and assessment of specific stakeholders – their distance or proximity, and whether they form clusters that might be explained using country-specific knowledge.

## Annex 3 Outcome of the survey in tables

### Overall perception of independence

Q1 The professional judges in my country are on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence"):

	Response	Average	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Austria	583	6.0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	18%	42%	34%
Belgium	437	6.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	11%	24%	41%	19%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	399	7.1	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	5%	0%	20%	29%	15%	0%
Bulgaria	508	7.1	1%	0%	1%	2%	4%	9%	0%	17%	22%	18%	19%
Croatia	261	7.0	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	10%	0%	9%	20%	19%	19%
Cyprus	72	6.2	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	1%	5%	90%
Czech Republic	166	6.7	1%	1%	2%	1%	0%	2%	2%	4%	16%	38%	34%
Denmark	163	6.6	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	14%	85%
Estonia	79	6.9	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	22%	30%
Finland	283	6.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	10%	38%	48%
France	1 504	6.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	11%	28%	37%	19%
Germany	3 112	6.8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	6%	20%	41%	29%
Greece	602	7.6	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	0%	1%	18%	28%	22%	11%
Hungary	365	7.0	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	1%	0%	18%	22%	14%	13%
Ireland	153	6.6	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%	5%	23%	78%
Italy	566	6.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	4%	12%	22%	29%	23%
Latvia	212	7.8	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	12%	22%	28%	3%
Lithuania	266	6.5	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	4%	1%	12%	22%	29%	23%
Moldova	146	7.2	2%	0%	1%	2%	1%	12%	2%	15%	17%	18%	22%
Montenegro	62	6.6	0%	2%	0%	2%	0%	10%	2%	20%	21%	12%	11%
Netherlands	651	6.0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	14%	11%	38%
Norway	261	6.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	12%	5%	11%
Poland	606	6.6	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	2%	8%	28%	31%	21%
Romania	1 242	6.8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	2%	6%	20%	25%	36%
Slovakia	606	6.2	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%	14%	28%	24%	23%
Slovenia	171	7.5	0%	1%	1%	2%	2%	10%	0%	9%	20%	20%	0%
Spain	1 026	6.0	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	4%	14%	28%	28%	17%
Sweden	491	6.5	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%	2%	8%	21%	32%	23%
Ukraine	312	5.9	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	22%	11%	19%	17%	3%	3%
UK, England and Wales	672	6.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	23%	68%
UK, Northern Ireland	36	6.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	12%	28%	38%
UK, Scotland	63	6.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%	4%	14%	32%	41%
Average	-	6.4	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	2%	9%	20%	28%	21%

Q2 As a judge, I am on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence"):

	Response	Average	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Austria	583	8.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	10%	20%	50%
Bulgaria	457	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%	4%	16%	20%	48%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	308	8.8	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	10%	30%	48%
Bulgaria	508	8.9	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	11%	20%	53%
Croatia	381	8.8	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	4%	3%	1%	12%	14%	53%
Cyprus	72	8.6	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	17%	38%
Czech Republic	168	9.1	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	1%	8%	37%	57%
Denmark	183	9.9	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	11%	88%
Estonia	79	9.2	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	3%	6%	23%	63%
Finland	383	9.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	7%	28%	62%
France	1 504	9.2	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	14%	29%	50%
Germany	3 113	9.0	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	4%	13%	34%	43%
Greece	882	8.5	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	3%	4%	8%	17%	24%	40%
Hungary	385	8.4	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	0%	4%	7%	14%	20%	43%
Ireland	153	9.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	10%	79%
Italy	998	8.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	11%	20%	63%
Latvia	212	9.2	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	2%	23%	37%
Lithuania	208	8.8	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	2%	4%	15%	31%	44%
Moldova	148	8.8	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	2%	4%	10%	17%	58%
Montenegro	87	8.0	0%	2%	1%	2%	3%	11%	2%	7%	17%	8%	44%
Netherlands	851	8.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	10%	30%	51%
Norway	301	9.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	8%	28%	59%
Portugal	888	8.5	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	11%	22%	61%
Romania	1 243	8.4	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	3%	11%	19%	65%
Slovakia	528	8.3	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	12%	19%	64%
Slovenia	171	8.3	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%	0%	2%	9%	20%	28%	38%
Spain	1 038	9.2	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	4%	10%	18%	62%
Sweden	481	9.1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	4%	14%	23%	56%
Ukraine	313	8.8	2%	2%	2%	0%	2%	10%	4%	14%	18%	18%	17%
UK, England and Wales	873	8.8	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	10%	72%
UK, Northern Ireland	38	8.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	14%	78%
UK, Scotland	83	8.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%	10%	20%	63%
Average	-	9.0	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	2%	4%	11%	22%	55%

Q3 Only answer if there exists a Council for the judiciary in your country: On a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "the highest possible degree of independence). The Council for the judiciary in my country is:

	Responses	Average	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Austria *													
Belgium	427	6.5	2%	2%	2%	4%	5%	10%	12%	20%	20%	18%	6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	275	5.5	8%	8%	8%	2%	2%	22%	2%	12%	12%	7%	11%
Bulgaria	481	4.6	20%	12%	8%	7%	3%	10%	6%	4%	7%	8%	7%
Croatia	360	5.8	8%	8%	5%	3%	5%	17%	6%	8%	11%	8%	18%
Cyprus *													
Czech Republic *													
Denmark	166	7.3	1%	1%	1%	4%	1%	6%	9%	8%	23%	20%	10%
Estonia	76	7.1	1%	4%	1%	3%	3%	14%	6%	17%	19%	18%	17%
Finland	366	6.6	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%	8%	18%	28%	35%
France	1,630	7.9	0%	1%	1%	1%	2%	7%	8%	6%	21%	22%	21%
Germany *													
Greece	704	6.5	3%	2%	4%	4%	2%	12%	10%	12%	13%	14%	14%
Hungary	971	5.5	7%	6%	5%	7%	6%	10%	1%	12%	12%	7%	16%
Ireland	150	6.5	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%	2%	8%	12%	74%
Italy	557	6.9	1%	2%	1%	3%	2%	13%	14%	20%	20%	16%	12%
Latvia	219	7.1	2%	2%	0%	4%	4%	5%	10%	9%	20%	20%	6%
Lithuania	199	7.6	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	10%	4%	10%	20%	19%	25%
Moldova	148	7.0	7%	1%	4%	2%	3%	11%	5%	5%	14%	19%	28%
Montenegro	85	6.0	5%	2%	5%	8%	4%	20%	0%	12%	18%	4%	14%
Netherlands	633	6.5	1%	1%	2%	3%	5%	6%	14%	20%	19%	16%	5%
Norway	398	7.9	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	7%	17%	21%	22%	16%
Poland	963	7.5	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	6%	8%	14%	22%	15%	22%
Romania	1,238	6.3	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	7%	5%	8%	13%	16%	40%
Slovakia	308	6.7	2%	2%	2%	6%	2%	6%	8%	11%	13%	13%	16%
Slovenia	171	6.9	0%	4%	2%	4%	5%	0%	8%	9%	28%	15%	8%
Spain	1,023	6.4	20%	11%	11%	10%	8%	17%	8%	7%	4%	2%	2%
Sweden *													
Ukraine	367	5.5	4%	8%	7%	7%	7%	22%	7%	11%	12%	5%	7%
UK, England and Wales	341	6.2	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	2%	7%	14%	72%
UK, Northern Ireland	23	6.7	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	26%	70%
UK, Scotland	86	6.5	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	17%	17%	52%
Average **		7.0	4%	2%	2%	4%	2%	12%	7%	11%	16%	14%	20%

\* Country has no Council for the Judiciary  
\*\* only including countries that have a Council for the Judiciary

Q4 Only answer if there exists a Council for the Judiciary in your country:  
 I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria *	-	-	-	-
Belgium	427	35%	38%	27%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	277	35%	36%	28%
Bulgaria	488	42%	28%	30%
Croatia	357	47%	31%	22%
Cyprus *	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic *	-	-	-	-
Denmark	182	51%	41%	8%
Estonia	77	38%	28%	34%
Finland	278	57%	32%	11%
France	1.022	58%	23%	21%
Germany *	-	-	-	-
Greece	787	37%	35%	27%
Hungary	948	25%	25%	50%
Ireland	130	78%	15%	8%
Italy	557	57%	15%	28%
Latvia	240	49%	38%	14%
Lithuania	199	49%	33%	18%
Moldova	144	78%	15%	8%
Montenegro	88	43%	30%	27%
Netherlands	838	24%	36%	37%
Norway	298	43%	42%	15%
Portugal	685	57%	22%	21%
Romania	1.235	63%	25%	17%
Slovakia	472	47%	34%	18%
Slovenia	170	37%	42%	21%
Spain	1.028	20%	22%	58%
Sweden *	-	-	-	-
Ukraine	358	36%	34%	30%
UK, England and Wales	350	57%	31%	12%
UK, Northern Ireland	33	57%	22%	22%
UK, Scotland	38	61%	22%	17%
Average **	-	47%	29%	23%

\* ) country has no Council for the Judiciary  
 \*\* ) only including countries that have a Council for the Judiciary

## Aspects of independence: implementation of judgments

Q5 In the last three years, I believe judgments that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	585	73%	15%	9%
Belgium	438	24%	32%	45%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	308	35%	36%	19%
Bulgaria	502	6%	46%	48%
Croatia	361	36%	36%	28%
Cyprus	72	31%	35%	35%
Czech Republic	282	39%	32%	29%
Denmark	165	74%	16%	7%
Estonia	79	56%	36%	11%
Finland	284	67%	25%	8%
France	1,940	52%	31%	17%
Germany	3,118	66%	13%	19%
Greece	805	19%	43%	38%
Hungary	960	27%	43%	30%
Ireland	153	76%	9%	15%
Italy	561	24%	21%	55%
Latvia	212	28%	52%	19%
Lithuania	201	33%	33%	44%
Moldova	148	20%	47%	32%
Montenegro	87	40%	41%	19%
Netherlands	652	58%	28%	13%
Norway	303	77%	14%	9%
Portugal	671	31%	48%	23%
Romania	1,244	39%	38%	25%
Slovakia	527	25%	58%	17%
Slovenia	171	22%	37%	40%
Spain	1,040	28%	24%	48%
Sweden	491	78%	12%	10%
Ukraine	374	15%	45%	40%
UK: England and Wales	675	73%	15%	12%
UK: Northern Ireland	58	56%	28%	17%
UK: Scotland	84	61%	24%	15%
Average	-	43%	32%	25%

**Aspects of independence: influence of the European Union**

Q6 I believe that the independence of the judiciary in my country is strengthened by being part of the European Union, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union or being part of the EEA

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	584	66%	24%	10%
Belgium	438	53%	38%	10%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	304	57%	35%	8%
Bulgaria	403	52%	29%	19%
Croatia	358	68%	22%	10%
Cyprus	72	61%	31%	8%
Czech Republic	380	71%	20%	9%
Denmark	164	37%	54%	9%
Estonia	76	80%	15%	5%
Finland	283	37%	45%	18%
France	1,937	71%	18%	12%
Germany	3,099	55%	30%	14%
Greece	765	53%	33%	14%
Hungary	998	63%	20%	17%
Ireland	133	63%	11%	6%
Italy	561	70%	15%	14%
Latvia	211	79%	16%	5%
Lithuania	301	80%	14%	6%
Moldova	148	47%	28%	25%
Montenegro	87	58%	34%	10%
Netherlands	649	75%	20%	5%
Norway	303	43%	45%	12%
Portugal	660	65%	25%	10%
Romania	1,239	63%	11%	5%
Slovakia	527	74%	18%	8%
Slovenia	170	44%	35%	21%
Spain	1,040	65%	19%	15%
Sweden	490	54%	40%	6%
Ukraine	360	44%	33%	23%
UK - England and Wales *	625	28%	41%	31%
UK - Northern Ireland *	35	51%	23%	26%
UK - Scotland *	94	41%	35%	23%
Average **	-	62%	27%	12%
*) country is not part of the EU or the EEA				
**) excluding UK				

## Aspects of independence: case-related external pressure

Q7 During the last three years I have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	604	1%	1%	1%	1%	96%
Belgium	438	2%	2%	4%	4%	88%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	324	1%	3%	2%	4%	90%
Bulgaria	525	0%	3%	5%	5%	87%
Croatia	376	1%	5%	3%	4%	87%
Cyprus	74	1%	1%	3%	0%	95%
Czech Republic	382	0%	1%	2%	2%	95%
Denmark	170	0%	0%	2%	1%	97%
Estonia	82	2%	1%	1%	1%	94%
Finland	303	0%	1%	7%	1%	91%
France	2,098	1%	3%	5%	3%	88%
Germany	3,317	1%	2%	2%	2%	94%
Greece	881	1%	3%	3%	4%	88%
Hungary	1,027	1%	2%	3%	4%	90%
Ireland	137	0%	0%	0%	1%	99%
Italy	609	0%	3%	2%	2%	92%
Latvia	217	0%	8%	3%	12%	78%
Lithuania	219	0%	1%	4%	4%	90%
Moldova	157	0%	3%	0%	1%	96%
Montenegro	89	1%	0%	0%	7%	92%
Netherlands	884	0%	1%	1%	1%	97%
Norway	309	0%	1%	1%	2%	96%
Portugal	1,004	1%	2%	1%	2%	94%
Romania	1,328	0%	0%	0%	1%	99%
Slovakia	630	1%	2%	4%	2%	91%
Slovenia	182	1%	1%	1%	7%	90%
Spain	1,098	1%	4%	3%	3%	87%
Sweden	511	0%	2%	4%	4%	90%
Ukraine	413	1%	4%	8%	8%	81%
UK: England and Wales	694	0%	1%	2%	2%	95%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	3%	8%	3%	0%	86%
UK: Scotland	98	2%	4%	1%	8%	87%
Average	-	0.76%	2%	2%	3%	91%

Q8 I believe that in my country during the last three years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	802	0%	0%	1%	11%	88%
Belgium	406	0%	2%	1%	16%	80%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	323	3%	9%	4%	34%	29%
Bulgaria	522	7%	15%	3%	46%	29%
Croatia	375	3%	10%	14%	46%	26%
Cyprus	73	0%	3%	0%	7%	90%
Czech Republic	292	0%	2%	3%	14%	80%
Denmark	170	0%	0%	1%	1%	98%
Estonia	62	0%	1%	0%	10%	89%
Finland	300	0%	1%	0%	2%	97%
France	2 079	0%	2%	0%	10%	88%
Germany	3 296	0%	1%	3%	11%	85%
Greece	857	3%	12%	3%	36%	43%
Hungary	1 024	1%	10%	0%	30%	52%
Ireland	137	0%	0%	0%	1%	99%
Italy	801	1%	6%	6%	35%	49%
Latvia	217	0%	0%	1%	35%	58%
Lithuania	207	0%	2%	4%	40%	54%
Moldova	156	2%	8%	4%	40%	46%
Montenegro	89	1%	3%	0%	26%	69%
Netherlands	663	0%	0%	0%	2%	98%
Norway	309	0%	0%	0%	2%	97%
Portugal	998	1%	4%	0%	16%	79%
Romania	1 319	0%	3%	5%	27%	64%
Slovakia	622	1%	7%	3%	36%	51%
Slovenia	181	1%	0%	4%	21%	74%
Spain	1 094	2%	0%	2%	16%	79%
Sweden	511	0%	0%	0%	1%	99%
Ukraine	409	2%	17%	20%	47%	14%
UK: England and Wales	692	0%	1%	0%	1%	98%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	0%	0%	3%	0%	97%
UK: Scotland	87	0%	1%	2%	1%	96%
Average	-	0.9%	4.3%	3.4%	20.6%	70.8%

Q9 I believe during the last three years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	551	2%	8%	90%
Belgium	446	4%	13%	83%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	11%	53%	58%
Bulgaria	914	7%	20%	73%
Croatia	371	7%	22%	71%
Cyprus	73	1%	3%	93%
Czech Republic	288	2%	5%	83%
Denmark	168	0%	1%	99%
Estonia	80	4%	14%	83%
Finland	292	2%	8%	91%
France	2,531	8%	9%	83%
Germany	3,198	2%	9%	92%
Greece	833	17%	53%	69%
Hungary	1,614	30%	20%	60%
Ireland	134	1%	1%	98%
Italy	563	6%	14%	80%
Latvia	215	5%	20%	70%
Lithuania	204	5%	14%	80%
Moldova	153	5%	18%	77%
Montenegro	88	7%	23%	70%
Netherlands	660	2%	9%	89%
Norway	308	2%	9%	93%
Portugal	868	8%	18%	77%
Romania	1,265	2%	9%	89%
Slovakia	607	3%	10%	87%
Slovenia	176	8%	17%	77%
Spain	1,674	22%	20%	58%
Sweden	505	5%	8%	87%
Ukraine	385	5%	14%	82%
UK, England and Wales	663	2%	2%	93%
UK, Northern Ireland	37	2%	2%	93%
UK, Scotland	85	4%	8%	87%
Average	-	6%	13%	81%

Q10 During the last three years my decisions or actions have been directly affected by a claim, or a threat of a claim, for personal liability

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	591	6%	2%	89%
Belgium	446	2%	2%	96%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	330	9%	8%	83%
Bulgaria	314	6%	6%	88%
Croatia	371	4%	3%	93%
Cyprus	73	1%	1%	97%
Czech Republic	288	1%	2%	97%
Denmark	168	0%	0%	100%
Estonia	80	4%	1%	95%
Finland	292	7%	2%	91%
France	2,831	2%	2%	96%
Germany	2,198	4%	2%	94%
Greece	833	1%	2%	97%
Hungary	1,014	16%	6%	78%
Ireland	134	1%	0%	99%
Italy	563	10%	8%	82%
Latvia	215	11%	6%	83%
Lithuania	204	1%	2%	96%
Moldova	153	6%	7%	87%
Montenegro	88	12%	7%	81%
Netherlands	660	0%	0%	99%
Norway	308	0%	1%	99%
Portugal	868	1%	2%	97%
Romania	1,285	2%	2%	96%
Slovakia	607	3%	2%	94%
Slovenia	178	2%	8%	90%
Spain	1,574	10%	5%	85%
Sweden	505	2%	2%	97%
Ukraine	385	7%	10%	83%
UK: England and Wales	663	0%	0%	99%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	0%	0%	100%
UK: Scotland	85	3%	1%	96%
Average	-	4%	3%	93%

Q11 I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last two years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	591	14%	27%	59%
Belgium	448	13%	24%	62%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	31%	44%	25%
Bulgaria	514	32%	39%	34%
Croatia	371	51%	28%	24%
Cyprus	73	8%	29%	62%
Czech Republic	288	8%	24%	68%
Denmark	188	0%	3%	97%
Estonia	80	14%	24%	62%
Finland	292	4%	19%	77%
France	2 031	19%	23%	58%
Germany	2 198	12%	29%	59%
Greece	833	40%	33%	27%
Hungary	1 014	38%	39%	22%
Ireland	134	4%	13%	83%
Italy	583	30%	24%	46%
Latvia	215	27%	38%	35%
Lithuania	204	23%	38%	40%
Moldova	153	29%	31%	44%
Montenegro	88	33%	41%	26%
Netherlands	690	3%	18%	79%
Norway	308	6%	20%	74%
Portugal	998	24%	29%	51%
Romania	1 295	11%	24%	65%
Slovakia	607	47%	23%	30%
Slovenia	178	13%	30%	57%
Spain	1 074	24%	21%	55%
Sweden	505	8%	28%	64%
Ukraine	385	48%	37%	15%
UK: England and Wales	683	7%	19%	72%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	5%	19%	76%
UK: Scotland	95	8%	23%	71%
Average	-	20%	29%	51%

Q12 I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last three years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, social media postings (for example, Facebook, X or LinkedIn)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	591	3%	28%	63%
Belgium	448	50%	25%	65%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	24%	44%	32%
Bulgaria	514	18%	41%	40%
Croatia	371	31%	34%	33%
Cyprus	73	4%	28%	67%
Czech Republic	288	3%	20%	76%
Denmark	188	0%	5%	95%
Estonia	80	50%	18%	71%
Finland	250	4%	18%	77%
France	2 031	11%	32%	67%
Germany	3 168	8%	28%	64%
Greece	633	25%	36%	38%
Hungary	1 014	24%	30%	43%
Ireland	134	3%	13%	85%
Italy	583	20%	28%	54%
Latvia	215	14%	38%	50%
Lithuania	204	55%	33%	67%
Moldova	153	18%	31%	53%
Montenegro	88	15%	41%	44%
Netherlands	680	2%	18%	79%
Norway	308	4%	14%	82%
Portugal	698	12%	28%	60%
Romania	1 295	7%	21%	72%
Slovakia	607	34%	27%	38%
Slovenia	176	7%	23%	69%
Spain	1 074	18%	33%	61%
Sweden	605	3%	28%	70%
Ukraine	385	40%	41%	18%
UK: England and Wales	685	3%	16%	80%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	3%	14%	81%
UK: Scotland	85	2%	23%	75%
Average	-	12%	28%	61%

Q13. In the last three years, in my function as a judge, I have been subjected to intimidation and/or threats by court users or others from outside the court.

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	No
Austria	581	1%	8%	28%	65%
Belgium	448	1%	7%	23%	69%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	1%	8%	15%	76%
Bulgaria	514	0%	2%	15%	82%
Croatia	371	1%	10%	18%	71%
Cyprus	73	1%	2%	4%	92%
Czech Republic	288	1%	2%	10%	81%
Denmark	188	0%	2%	12%	85%
Estonia	80	1%	15%	38%	51%
Finland	292	0%	4%	32%	64%
France	2,031	0%	12%	34%	54%
Germany	3,188	1%	8%	28%	64%
Greece	833	1%	3%	12%	82%
Hungary	1,014	1%	12%	20%	68%
Ireland	134	1%	10%	28%	61%
Italy	583	0%	2%	10%	88%
Latvia	215	1%	8%	14%	77%
Lithuania	204	1%	11%	23%	65%
Moldova	153	2%	12%	26%	58%
Montenegro	88	0%	12%	14%	74%
Netherlands	680	0%	1%	23%	76%
Norway	308	1%	10%	28%	60%
Portugal	686	0%	2%	14%	78%
Romania	1,285	0%	2%	14%	82%
Slovakia	827	2%	8%	17%	73%
Slovenia	178	2%	15%	38%	45%
Spain	1,074	1%	10%	18%	70%
Sweden	505	0%	4%	10%	81%
Ukraine	385	2%	10%	28%	58%
UK: England and Wales	683	2%	12%	28%	57%
UK: Northern Ireland	27	2%	14%	41%	38%
UK: Scotland	85	0%	18%	17%	64%
Average	-	1%	8%	22%	68%

Q14 In the last three years, in my function as a judge, I have been physically attacked by court users or others from outside the court.

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	No
Austria	591	0%	0%	1%	99%
Belgium	446	0%	0%	0%	99%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	0%	0%	2%	98%
Bulgaria	914	0%	0%	1%	99%
Croatia	371	0%	0%	1%	99%
Cyprus	73	0%	0%	0%	100%
Czech Republic	368	0%	0%	1%	99%
Denmark	168	0%	0%	1%	99%
Estonia	80	0%	0%	0%	99%
Finland	390	0%	0%	1%	99%
France	2,031	0%	1%	6%	93%
Germany	3,168	0%	0%	1%	99%
Greece	833	0%	0%	2%	98%
Hungary	1,014	0%	0%	0%	100%
Ireland	134	0%	1%	0%	99%
Italy	583	0%	1%	0%	97%
Latvia	215	0%	0%	1%	99%
Lithuania	304	0%	0%	0%	99%
Moldova	153	1%	1%	0%	98%
Montenegro	68	0%	0%	0%	99%
Netherlands	660	0%	0%	0%	99%
Norway	308	0%	0%	1%	99%
Portugal	586	0%	0%	0%	99%
Romania	1,299	0%	0%	1%	99%
Slovakia	807	0%	0%	0%	99%
Slovenia	179	0%	0%	0%	99%
Spain	1,074	0%	0%	1%	99%
Sweden	505	0%	0%	0%	100%
Ukraine	365	0%	1%	0%	97%
UK, England and Wales	663	0%	0%	0%	99%
UK, Northern Ireland	37	0%	0%	0%	99%
UK, Scotland	95	0%	0%	1%	99%
Average	-	0%	0%	0%	99%

## Aspects of independence: case-related internal pressure

Q15 During the last three years I have been affected by a threat of, or actual, disciplinary or other official action because of how I have decided a case

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly Disagree
Austria	801	2%	1%	97%
Belgium	456	3%	2%	94%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	322	6%	3%	89%
Bulgaria	522	7%	4%	89%
Croatia	373	6%	3%	92%
Cyprus	73	3%	4%	93%
Czech Republic	282	1%	1%	98%
Denmark	680	1%	1%	98%
Estonia	87	6%	0%	94%
Finland	299	7%	1%	92%
France	2,078	6%	2%	92%
Germany	1,293	2%	1%	97%
Greece	855	6%	6%	88%
Hungary	1,028	3%	2%	95%
Ireland	127	6%	0%	94%
Italy	600	6%	3%	91%
Latvia	218	6%	12%	81%
Lithuania	205	6%	1%	93%
Moldova	198	12%	6%	82%
Montenegro	88	2%	2%	94%
Netherlands	882	1%	0%	99%
Norway	709	4%	1%	95%
Portugal	987	6%	3%	92%
Romania	1,317	5%	3%	92%
Slovakia	618	6%	1%	93%
Slovenia	179	0%	2%	98%
Spain	1,081	6%	4%	90%
Sweden	510	3%	2%	95%
Ukraine	403	16%	6%	78%
UK - England and Wales	892	2%	1%	97%
UK - Northern Ireland	37	5%	0%	95%
UK - Scotland	97	5%	2%	93%
Average	-	6%	2%	92%

Q16 During the last three years the management of my court has exerted pressure on me to decide individual cases in a particular way.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	585	2%	1%	97%
Belgium	438	4%	3%	93%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	306	4%	4%	92%
Bulgaria	502	4%	2%	94%
Croatia	361	5%	4%	91%
Cyprus	73	4%	0%	96%
Czech Republic	282	2%	3%	95%
Denmark	185	1%	0%	99%
Estonia	79	4%	1%	95%
Finland	354	2%	1%	97%
France	1,940	4%	3%	93%
Germany	3,118	1%	1%	97%
Greece	605	3%	3%	94%
Hungary	660	4%	3%	93%
Ireland	133	4%	2%	94%
Italy	561	4%	3%	93%
Latvia	212	0%	8%	92%
Lithuania	201	2%	4%	94%
Moldova	148	1%	0%	99%
Montenegro	67	3%	3%	94%
Netherlands	652	1%	1%	98%
Norway	303	3%	3%	94%
Portugal	671	3%	4%	94%
Romania	1,264	0%	1%	99%
Slovakia	527	2%	2%	97%
Slovenia	171	1%	2%	97%
Spain	1,040	0%	2%	98%
Sweden	491	3%	2%	95%
Ukraine	374	3%	3%	94%
UK, England and Wales	675	2%	2%	96%
UK, Northern Ireland	36	8%	0%	94%
UK, Scotland	94	11%	3%	86%
Average	-	3%	2%	94%

Q17 During the last two years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to decide individual cases within a particular time

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	585	13%	5%	81%
Belgium	438	8%	3%	89%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	306	12%	8%	79%
Bulgaria	502	4%	4%	92%
Croatia	361	18%	8%	73%
Cyprus	72	6%	1%	93%
Czech Republic	262	13%	10%	76%
Denmark	165	3%	2%	95%
Estonia	79	11%	6%	82%
Finland	264	6%	3%	91%
France	1,860	10%	4%	86%
Germany	3,118	7%	5%	88%
Greece	805	14%	4%	81%
Hungary	690	13%	8%	81%
Ireland	133	8%	2%	90%
Italy	561	8%	3%	89%
Latvia	212	14%	12%	74%
Lithuania	201	9%	6%	84%
Moldova	148	1%	2%	97%
Montenegro	87	17%	10%	72%
Netherlands	653	3%	4%	93%
Norway	303	12%	7%	81%
Portugal	971	8%	7%	85%
Romania	1,244	3%	3%	94%
Slovakia	527	13%	6%	80%
Slovenia	171	16%	8%	71%
Spain	1,040	7%	4%	89%
Sweden	491	6%	7%	87%
Ukraine	374	3%	3%	94%
UK, England and Wales	675	13%	5%	82%
UK, Northern Ireland	36	8%	0%	92%
UK, Scotland	94	21%	11%	68%
Average	-	10%	5%	84%

Q18 During the last three years the management of my court has exerted inappropriate pressure on me to reach production targets (number of adjudicated cases)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	585	19%	8%	72%
Belgium	438	19%	8%	71%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	308	21%	8%	71%
Bulgaria	602	8%	3%	82%
Croatia	381	27%	11%	62%
Cyprus	13	11%	38%	74%
Czech Republic	282	12%	18%	69%
Denmark	185	5%	3%	82%
Estonia	79	18%	6%	76%
Finland	284	8%	7%	85%
France	1 840	27%	7%	66%
Germany	3 118	10%	8%	81%
Greece	805	21%	11%	68%
Hungary	990	24%	8%	67%
Ireland	133	8%	1%	81%
Italy	561	19%	4%	77%
Latvia	212	12%	18%	71%
Lithuania	201	18%	8%	75%
Moldova	148	2%	3%	95%
Montenegro	87	20%	17%	63%
Netherlands	852	7%	8%	84%
Norway	303	12%	8%	80%
Portugal	871	20%	12%	67%
Romania	1 244	8%	3%	87%
Slovakia	627	20%	8%	72%
Slovenia	171	22%	14%	63%
Spain	1 040	28%	8%	64%
Sweden	491	11%	6%	83%
Ukraine	374	4%	3%	93%
UK (England and Wales)	675	12%	7%	80%
UK (Northern Ireland)	36	14%	0%	86%
UK (Scotland)	94	20%	7%	72%
Average	-	15%	8%	77%

Q19 During the last two years I have had to take decisions in accordance with guidelines developed by judges contrary to my professional opinion

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Albania	585	4%	5%	91%
Belgium	438	7%	6%	86%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	308	11%	14%	75%
Bulgaria	502	18%	13%	70%
Croatia	351	21%	11%	67%
Cyprus	72	1%	1%	97%
Czech Republic	282	17%	16%	67%
Denmark	165	1%	1%	98%
Estonia	79	8%	8%	83%
Finland	284	3%	3%	94%
France	1,940	8%	5%	87%
Germany	3,118	4%	5%	91%
Greece	805	8%	7%	85%
Hungary	660	17%	8%	75%
Ireland	133	13%	6%	81%
Italy	581	11%	5%	83%
Latvia	212	16%	17%	67%
Lithuania	201	12%	11%	77%
Moldova	148	4%	7%	89%
Montenegro	87	21%	14%	65%
Netherlands	652	8%	4%	88%
Norway	303	8%	6%	86%
Portugal	571	4%	5%	91%
Romania	1,244	5%	4%	91%
Slovakia	527	17%	10%	73%
Slovenia	171	8%	10%	82%
Spain	1,040	8%	7%	85%
Sweden	491	7%	5%	88%
Ukraine	374	12%	13%	74%
UK, England and Wales	675	12%	6%	82%
UK, Northern Ireland	38	8%	3%	82%
UK, Scotland	84	30%	9%	62%
Average	-	10%	8%	82%

**Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges**

Q20 I believe judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	591	16%	21%	63%
Belgium	446	18%	28%	54%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	36%	40%	24%
Bulgaria	514	32%	34%	33%
Croatia	371	29%	28%	43%
Cyprus	73	10%	18%	72%
Czech Republic	288	11%	20%	69%
Denmark	168	7%	1%	92%
Estonia	80	19%	24%	56%
Finland	202	10%	13%	77%
France	2,031	6%	6%	88%
Germany	3,168	9%	15%	76%
Greece	633	18%	26%	56%
Hungary	1,014	58%	19%	23%
Ireland	134	17%	16%	67%
Italy	583	7%	11%	82%
Latvia	215	16%	22%	61%
Lithuania	304	28%	32%	39%
Moldova	153	16%	29%	54%
Montenegro	88	15%	36%	49%
Netherlands	660	3%	6%	92%
Norway	308	10%	11%	79%
Portugal	686	13%	23%	64%
Romania	1,265	4%	13%	83%
Slovakia	607	10%	18%	71%
Slovenia	178	24%	28%	48%
Spain	1,074	16%	17%	67%
Sweden	505	14%	17%	69%
Ukraine	365	15%	25%	60%
UK: England and Wales	683	8%	11%	81%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	5%	0%	95%
UK: Scotland	69	11%	13%	77%
Average	-	16%	20%	64%

Q21 I believe judges in my country have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	591	18%	39%	52%
Belgium	448	5%	20%	75%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	26%	47%	24%
Bulgaria	514	30%	36%	31%
Croatia	371	30%	37%	30%
Cyprus	73	10%	10%	79%
Czech Republic	288	13%	33%	54%
Denmark	188	1%	6%	93%
Estonia	80	21%	24%	55%
Finland	292	7%	24%	69%
France	2,031	8%	17%	75%
Germany	3,188	30%	33%	34%
Greece	833	36%	28%	36%
Hungary	1,814	70%	14%	11%
Ireland	134	6%	12%	82%
Italy	583	24%	33%	43%
Latvia	215	19%	27%	54%
Lithuania	204	29%	26%	46%
Moldova	153	20%	20%	54%
Montenegro	88	16%	33%	49%
Netherlands	880	1%	6%	93%
Norway	308	5%	12%	85%
Portugal	888	25%	31%	44%
Romania	1,295	10%	21%	69%
Slovakia	807	12%	30%	58%
Slovenia	178	36%	34%	30%
Spain	1,074	56%	20%	22%
Sweden	505	4%	23%	73%
Ukraine	385	16%	43%	38%
UK: England and Wales	683	2%	10%	88%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	5%	3%	92%
UK: Scotland	88	4%	15%	81%
Average	-	18%	24%	57%

Q22 I believe judges in my country in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted /appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last three years (Note experience may include seniority)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	591	14%	27%	59%
Belgium	445	19%	28%	53%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	41%	36%	20%
Bulgaria	914	36%	35%	29%
Croatia	371	38%	33%	29%
Cyprus	73	11%	18%	70%
Czech Republic	388	12%	21%	67%
Denmark	188	2%	2%	96%
Estonia	80	24%	20%	56%
Finland	292	10%	19%	72%
France	2,031	22%	21%	58%
Germany	3,188	26%	24%	49%
Greece	833	27%	28%	46%
Hungary	1,014	57%	21%	22%
Ireland	134	13%	13%	75%
Italy	583	45%	21%	34%
Latvia	215	20%	23%	58%
Lithuania	304	28%	25%	47%
Moldova	153	21%	25%	54%
Montenegro	88	17%	25%	44%
Netherlands	650	8%	13%	81%
Norway	308	8%	13%	79%
Portugal	688	29%	24%	47%
Romania	1,285	14%	18%	68%
Serbia	607	15%	28%	57%
Slovenia	178	34%	20%	46%
Spain	1,074	22%	18%	61%
Sweden	505	15%	17%	68%
Ukraine	385	10%	28%	62%
UK: England and Wales	883	9%	11%	80%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	8%	3%	89%
UK: Scotland	85	8%	18%	75%
Average	-	21%	23%	57%

## Aspects of independence: working conditions

Q23.1 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Pay, pensions, retirement age

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Albania	586	6%	7%	84%
Belgium	440	42%	14%	44%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	325	6%	18%	76%
Bulgaria	608	8%	20%	73%
Croatia	361	17%	16%	66%
Cyprus	72	3%	22%	75%
Czech Republic	283	39%	11%	48%
Denmark	185	2%	1%	97%
Estonia	79	52%	4%	43%
Finland	285	13%	6%	79%
France	1,498	12%	6%	80%
Germany	1,138	26%	11%	64%
Greece	609	17%	25%	60%
Hungary	991	73%	6%	21%
Ireland	134	7%	6%	84%
Italy	953	6%	6%	82%
Latvia	212	25%	14%	61%
Lithuania	201	17%	6%	73%
Moldova	150	42%	17%	41%
Montenegro	87	51%	6%	40%
Netherlands	654	4%	6%	89%
Norway	307	10%	4%	86%
Portugal	975	19%	17%	64%
Romania	1,250	37%	6%	54%
Slovakia	542	12%	6%	80%
Slovenia	173	44%	28%	27%
Spain	1,038	40%	14%	46%
Sweden	496	21%	7%	71%
Ukraine	374	69%	7%	24%
UK - England and Wales	679	11%	6%	84%
UK - Northern Ireland	38	14%	6%	81%
UK - Scotland	85	17%	6%	74%
Average	-	24%	11%	65%

Q23.2 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Working hours

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Albania	582	16%	10%	74%
Belgium	440	34%	10%	56%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	323	9%	15%	76%
Bulgaria	523	10%	15%	75%
Croatia	360	13%	14%	74%
Cyprus	73	7%	16%	77%
Czech Republic	282	5%	6%	87%
Denmark	184	4%	4%	92%
Estonia	79	22%	11%	67%
Finland	284	6%	13%	81%
France	1,644	27%	11%	61%
Germany	1,134	19%	11%	70%
Greece	608	32%	15%	53%
Hungary	688	20%	6%	74%
Ireland	133	6%	11%	83%
Italy	552	10%	6%	81%
Latvia	212	14%	12%	74%
Lithuania	189	22%	12%	66%
Moldova	149	17%	16%	64%
Montenegro	85	33%	18%	49%
Netherlands	653	6%	6%	88%
Norway	327	16%	10%	74%
Portugal	972	31%	14%	55%
Romania	1,247	16%	6%	73%
Slovakia	541	6%	6%	88%
Slovenia	188	6%	13%	78%
Spain	1,043	51%	11%	38%
Sweden	484	21%	6%	73%
Ukraine	372	19%	6%	72%
UK, England and Wales	678	13%	5%	82%
UK, Northern Ireland	38	11%	6%	83%
UK, Scotland	85	16%	6%	78%
Average	-	17%	11%	72%

Q23.3 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Caseload

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	588	20%	11%	69%
Belgium	437	39%	9%	52%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	398	20%	19%	61%
Bulgaria	504	20%	14%	66%
Croatia	363	32%	11%	57%
Cyprus	72	14%	14%	72%
Czech Republic	280	13%	19%	72%
Denmark	164	3%	3%	94%
Estonia	78	30%	10%	60%
Finland	288	19%	10%	71%
France	1,954	34%	12%	54%
Germany	1,127	31%	13%	57%
Greece	807	43%	11%	46%
Hungary	990	38%	9%	53%
Ireland	133	8%	8%	84%
Italy	563	28%	8%	64%
Latvia	211	36%	12%	49%
Lithuania	201	38%	17%	45%
Moldova	148	38%	20%	42%
Montenegro	88	62%	8%	30%
Netherlands	651	8%	12%	80%
Norway	206	16%	11%	74%
Portugal	973	34%	13%	53%
Romania	1,248	39%	10%	51%
Slovakia	540	23%	10%	67%
Slovenia	170	29%	24%	47%
Spain	1,043	58%	9%	32%
Sweden	485	29%	7%	64%
Ukraine	373	49%	10%	41%
UK: England and Wales	674	16%	4%	80%
UK: Northern Ireland	36	19%	3%	78%
UK: Scotland	85	22%	7%	71%
Average	-	28%	11%	61%

Q23.4 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Court Resources

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	568	22%	12%	66%
Belgium	438	45%	12%	43%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	304	20%	19%	61%
Bulgaria	506	13%	17%	70%
Croatia	361	23%	26%	51%
Cyprus	73	11%	21%	68%
Czech Republic	280	23%	19%	58%
Denmark	165	8%	8%	84%
Estonia	79	48%	6%	46%
Finland	263	16%	8%	73%
France	1 661	33%	14%	54%
Germany	3 130	30%	13%	57%
Greece	605	31%	19%	50%
Hungary	968	57%	12%	31%
Ireland	133	11%	8%	81%
Italy	665	31%	8%	61%
Latvia	210	26%	20%	54%
Lithuania	200	46%	16%	40%
Moldova	150	26%	21%	53%
Montenegro	65	16%	9%	72%
Netherlands	652	8%	18%	74%
Norway	309	17%	17%	67%
Portugal	672	22%	19%	62%
Romania	1 250	31%	11%	58%
Slovakia	540	16%	17%	68%
Slovenia	172	37%	36%	33%
Spain	1 037	28%	16%	56%
Sweden	487	28%	11%	61%
Ukraine	372	51%	14%	35%
UK: England and Wales	672	22%	8%	73%
UK: Northern Ireland	56	25%	8%	67%
UK: Scotland	95	21%	12%	67%
Average	-	28%	14%	58%

Q23.5 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category: Digitalization

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	588	10%	13%	77%
Belgium	440	28%	15%	55%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	505	9%	19%	72%
Bulgaria	504	10%	15%	72%
Croatia	560	22%	16%	62%
Cyprus	72	8%	16%	72%
Czech Republic	280	14%	16%	67%
Denmark	165	5%	8%	87%
Estonia	78	13%	12%	76%
Finland	263	12%	11%	76%
France	1 949	16%	17%	68%
Germany	5 129	26%	13%	61%
Greece	606	14%	20%	66%
Hungary	663	26%	16%	54%
Ireland	134	4%	13%	82%
Italy	592	24%	9%	67%
Latvia	209	36%	24%	41%
Lithuania	197	15%	22%	63%
Moldova	150	15%	23%	62%
Montenegro	65	40%	22%	38%
Netherlands	653	5%	10%	85%
Norway	308	6%	11%	82%
Portugal	667	20%	16%	64%
Romania	1 250	10%	13%	77%
Slovakia	540	11%	13%	76%
Slovenia	172	13%	26%	61%
Spain	1 041	32%	17%	51%
Sweden	495	21%	10%	69%
Ukraine	373	16%	19%	65%
UK, England and Wales	677	12%	7%	81%
UK, Northern Ireland	36	6%	14%	81%
UK, Scotland	64	7%	16%	77%
Average	-	16%	16%	68%

Q23.6 During the last three years changes occurred in my working conditions that negatively influenced my independence. Please indicate per category:  
Conduct at work (including sexual harassment and discrimination)

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	587	4%	4%	91%
Belgium	437	8%	9%	83%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	305	4%	12%	84%
Bulgaria	508	4%	10%	86%
Croatia	582	4%	14%	82%
Cyprus	73	3%	18%	79%
Czech Republic	281	4%	9%	87%
Denmark	165	2%	5%	93%
Estonia	79	8%	8%	84%
Finland	284	4%	8%	88%
France	1,406	11%	10%	79%
Germany	3,134	4%	5%	91%
Greece	807	11%	13%	76%
Hungary	999	13%	9%	78%
Ireland	134	8%	4%	88%
Italy	565	8%	7%	85%
Latvia	211	9%	20%	71%
Lithuania	209	9%	13%	78%
Moldova	150	3%	20%	77%
Montenegro	88	7%	12%	81%
Netherlands	852	4%	8%	88%
Norway	208	4%	2%	94%
Portugal	974	5%	12%	83%
Romania	1,248	3%	7%	90%
Slovakia	541	8%	8%	84%
Slovenia	172	13%	12%	74%
Spain	1,042	8%	14%	78%
Sweden	487	5%	7%	88%
Ukraine	273	3%	8%	89%
UK, England and Wales	677	3%	8%	89%
UK, Northern Ireland	36	3%	8%	89%
UK, Scotland	95	5%	11%	84%
Average	-	8%	9%	83%

## Accountability

Q24 In my country, I believe that judges adhere to high ethical standards

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	575	85%	8%	7%
Belgium	438	90%	8%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	53%	38%	9%
Bulgaria	485	57%	35%	8%
Croatia	357	48%	47%	6%
Cyprus	72	89%	7%	4%
Czech Republic	261	81%	14%	5%
Denmark	182	88%	7%	5%
Estonia	78	95%	3%	2%
Finland	280	94%	3%	1%
France	1,928	89%	7%	4%
Germany	3,088	87%	10%	3%
Greece	782	53%	32%	14%
Hungary	881	73%	21%	6%
Ireland	133	89%	2%	9%
Italy	557	78%	13%	8%
Latvia	210	75%	23%	2%
Lithuania	200	87%	11%	2%
Moldova	144	81%	17%	1%
Montenegro	87	68%	28%	4%
Netherlands	648	94%	3%	1%
Norway	301	98%	1%	1%
Portugal	698	83%	13%	4%
Romania	1,238	87%	10%	3%
Slovakia	474	83%	30%	7%
Slovenia	170	95%	3%	2%
Spain	1,028	78%	17%	5%
Sweden	488	94%	3%	2%
Ukraine	358	76%	23%	2%
UK, England and Wales	684	95%	2%	3%
UK, Northern Ireland	38	100%	0%	0%
UK, Scotland	82	93%	2%	4%
Average	-	82%	14%	4%

Q25 In my country, I believe that judicial misconduct is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	379	63%	20%	17%
Belgium	438	53%	32%	14%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	321	34%	42%	24%
Bulgaria	495	30%	41%	22%
Croatia	357	38%	41%	21%
Cyprus	72	78%	19%	4%
Czech Republic	281	67%	6%	5%
Denmark	182	82%	17%	1%
Estonia	78	77%	19%	4%
Finland	280	67%	10%	3%
France	1,928	43%	28%	11%
Germany	1,088	64%	28%	8%
Greece	792	37%	40%	23%
Hungary	981	62%	28%	9%
Ireland	133	64%	9%	7%
Italy	557	77%	13%	10%
Latvia	210	60%	18%	5%
Lithuania	300	75%	21%	5%
Moldova	144	61%	33%	6%
Montenegro	87	44%	48%	10%
Netherlands	619	60%	16%	4%
Norway	321	65%	12%	2%
Portugal	968	58%	26%	16%
Romania	1,238	73%	20%	8%
Slovakia	474	51%	32%	16%
Slovenia	170	39%	41%	21%
Spain	1,028	44%	37%	20%
Sweden	489	81%	15%	3%
Ukraine	359	51%	35%	14%
UK, England and Wales	664	61%	13%	6%
UK, Northern Ireland	36	78%	11%	11%
UK, Scotland	62	72%	18%	10%
Average	-	64%	28%	11%

Q26 In my country judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	576	78%	18%	4%
Belgium	428	58%	32%	10%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	25%	47%	28%
Bulgaria	495	34%	40%	26%
Croatia	357	34%	42%	24%
Cyprus	72	88%	10%	2%
Czech Republic	261	64%	11%	25%
Denmark	162	70%	28%	2%
Estonia	78	83%	13%	4%
Finland	280	81%	17%	2%
France	1,628	66%	24%	10%
Germany	3,086	78%	19%	4%
Greece	762	44%	41%	15%
Hungary	661	64%	28%	7%
Ireland	133	87%	11%	2%
Italy	557	52%	30%	17%
Latvia	210	86%	10%	4%
Lithuania	200	83%	16%	2%
Moldova	144	58%	33%	7%
Montenegro	87	38%	51%	11%
Netherlands	649	78%	21%	1%
Norway	301	80%	19%	1%
Portugal	668	61%	28%	10%
Romania	1,228	65%	27%	8%
Slovakia	474	52%	34%	14%
Slovenia	170	48%	44%	8%
Spain	1,028	70%	22%	8%
Sweden	489	73%	23%	2%
Ukraine	309	50%	38%	12%
UK: England and Wales	664	68%	11%	1%
UK: Northern Ireland	38	86%	14%	0%
UK: Scotland	60	84%	16%	0%
Average	-	69%	26%	5%

**Respect for judicial independence**

Q27.1 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the Council for the Judiciary

Council for the Judiciary	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria *	-	-	-	-
Belgium	408	82%	11%	7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	274	76%	18%	6%
Bulgaria	608	65%	24%	11%
Croatia	348	76%	12%	10%
Cyprus *	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic *	-	-	-	-
Denmark	182	85%	1%	1%
Estonia	78	69%	22%	9%
Finland	287	85%	8%	7%
France	1 969	83%	1%	1%
Germany *	-	-	-	-
Greece	791	74%	18%	10%
Hungary	1 005	59%	15%	26%
Ireland	134	85%	4%	1%
Italy	558	82%	8%	10%
Latvia	210	72%	18%	10%
Lithuania	201	80%	14%	6%
Moldova	148	77%	18%	6%
Montenegro	85	78%	14%	8%
Netherlands	844	81%	12%	7%
Norway	303	84%	8%	8%
Portugal	875	83%	8%	9%
Romania	1 348	82%	10%	8%
Slovakia	588	81%	12%	6%
Slovenia	182	86%	12%	2%
Spain	1 032	66%	14%	20%
Sweden *	-	-	-	-
Ukraine	374	52%	28%	20%
UK, England and Wales	447	88%	13%	1%
UK, Northern Ireland	23	89%	7%	4%
UK, Scotland	80	75%	12%	1%
Average **	-	79%	12%	9%

\*) country has no Council for the Judiciary  
 \*\*) only including countries that have a Council for the Judiciary

Q27.2 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by court management (incl. the president)

Court management	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	588	87%	6%	7%
Belgium	438	85%	7%	8%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	302	83%	9%	8%
Bulgaria	804	80%	9%	11%
Croatia	357	80%	8%	11%
Cyprus	69	88%	8%	3%
Czech Republic	283	89%	5%	5%
Denmark	163	89%	5%	7%
Estonia	79	82%	5%	13%
Finland	285	94%	2%	4%
France	1,690	84%	7%	9%
Germany	3,137	88%	6%	6%
Greece	808	83%	9%	8%
Hungary	1,003	70%	11%	19%
Ireland	134	83%	4%	3%
Italy	550	88%	5%	8%
Latvia	211	74%	17%	9%
Lithuania	201	80%	10%	10%
Moldova	145	82%	12%	6%
Montenegro	88	77%	18%	7%
Netherlands	845	90%	5%	5%
Norway	303	87%	6%	7%
Portugal	673	77%	18%	13%
Romania	1,251	88%	4%	7%
Slovakia	373	87%	7%	6%
Slovenia	172	75%	16%	9%
Spain	1,038	78%	15%	13%
Sweden	480	88%	7%	7%
Ukraine	374	83%	13%	5%
UK, England and Wales	650	89%	6%	5%
UK, Northern Ireland	35	83%	11%	6%
UK, Scotland	94	74%	11%	15%
Average	-	84%	8%	8%

Q27.3 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by Associations of Judges

Association of judges	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	584	86%	2%	2%
Belgium	305	81%	7%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	215	86%	9%	3%
Bulgaria	477	85%	26%	13%
Croatia	347	83%	10%	7%
Cyprus	72	93%	6%	1%
Czech Republic	254	84%	4%	3%
Denmark	165	98%	1%	1%
Estonia	79	88%	9%	5%
Finland	284	89%	11%	0%
France	1,818	93%	5%	4%
Germany	3,662	97%	2%	1%
Greece	809	85%	8%	7%
Hungary	1,002	92%	4%	4%
Ireland	134	93%	4%	3%
Italy	567	87%	7%	6%
Latvia	208	88%	9%	2%
Lithuania	188	91%	6%	3%
Moldova	137	75%	18%	6%
Montenegro	84	82%	14%	4%
Netherlands	581	98%	1%	1%
Norway	302	95%	2%	4%
Portugal	888	91%	6%	3%
Romania	1,180	78%	18%	8%
Slovakia	563	88%	8%	4%
Slovenia	148	88%	11%	3%
Spain	1,002	95%	6%	8%
Sweden	478	94%	6%	1%
Ukraine	337	82%	27%	10%
UK: England and Wales	817	94%	6%	1%
UK: Northern Ireland	31	94%	3%	3%
UK: Scotland	80	94%	3%	2%
Average	-	88%	8%	4%

Q27.4 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the Constitutional Court

Constitutional court	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	575	93%	4%	3%
Belgium	386	82%	0%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	271	84%	13%	3%
Bulgaria	490	69%	22%	9%
Croatia	348	78%	15%	7%
Cyprus *	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic	283	81%	5%	4%
Denmark *	-	-	-	-
Estonia *	-	-	-	-
Finland *	-	-	-	-
France	1 864	90%	6%	4%
Germany	3 096	84%	4%	2%
Greece	334	79%	14%	7%
Hungary	1 000	57%	24%	19%
Ireland	-	-	-	-
Italy	514	92%	6%	2%
Latvia	254	88%	10%	2%
Lithuania	201	87%	7%	6%
Moldova	142	58%	23%	19%
Montenegro	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	-	-	-	-
Norway	-	-	-	-
Portugal	985	88%	10%	2%
Romania	1 243	79%	12%	10%
Slovakia	587	89%	8%	3%
Slovenia	135	84%	14%	3%
Spain	925	55%	13%	32%
Sweden	-	-	-	-
Ukraine	373	57%	27%	16%
UK: England and Wales	-	-	-	-
UK: Northern Ireland	-	-	-	-
UK: Scotland	-	-	-	-
Average **	-	80%	12%	8%

\* ) country has no Constitutional Court  
\*\* ) only including countries that have a Constitutional Court

Q27.5 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the Supreme Court

Supreme Court	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	577	94%	3%	2%
Belgium	403	94%	5%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	278	94%	12%	4%
Bulgaria	553	75%	16%	9%
Croatia	354	83%	12%	5%
Cyprus	71	94%	4%	1%
Czech Republic	282	93%	4%	2%
Denmark	155	98%	1%	1%
Estonia	79	82%	10%	8%
Finland	284	94%	9%	1%
France	1 926	95%	2%	2%
Germany	3 087	94%	4%	2%
Greece	785	88%	20%	13%
Hungary	1 033	48%	21%	34%
Ireland	134	95%	4%	1%
Italy	488	85%	11%	4%
Latvia	209	78%	14%	8%
Lithuania	188	88%	9%	3%
Moldova	141	70%	18%	11%
Montenegro	88	72%	21%	7%
Netherlands	588	99%	1%	0%
Norway	298	95%	1%	4%
Portugal	981	89%	8%	3%
Romania	1 236	82%	10%	8%
Slovakia	587	91%	7%	2%
Slovenia	188	78%	18%	6%
Spain	973	89%	7%	6%
Sweden	485	98%	2%	1%
Ukraine	373	80%	27%	13%
UK: England and Wales	658	82%	8%	2%
UK: Northern Ireland	25	83%	14%	3%
UK: Scotland	81	88%	8%	3%
Average	-	85%	10%	9%

Q27.6 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the parties in procedures

Parties	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	587	80%	13%	7%
Belgium	833	81%	11%	9%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	391	67%	20%	13%
Bulgaria	507	51%	28%	21%
Croatia	331	54%	21%	26%
Cyprus	73	79%	11%	10%
Czech Republic	384	73%	19%	8%
Denmark	188	98%	1%	1%
Estonia	79	78%	10%	11%
Finland	287	90%	7%	3%
France	1,974	71%	19%	10%
Germany	3,128	78%	19%	3%
Greece	811	81%	24%	15%
Hungary	1,033	79%	11%	10%
Ireland	134	92%	4%	4%
Italy	955	77%	12%	11%
Latvia*	188	-	-	-
Lithuania	201	52%	30%	12%
Moldova*	138	-	-	-
Montenegro	88	57%	22%	21%
Netherlands	651	90%	10%	3%
Norway	304	94%	12%	4%
Portugal	972	74%	18%	10%
Romania*	1,224	-	-	-
Slovakia	370	64%	23%	13%
Slovenia	173	60%	27%	13%
Spain	1,035	81%	9%	10%
Sweden	485	85%	9%	6%
Ukraine	374	69%	30%	13%
UK: England and Wales	672	72%	13%	15%
UK: Northern Ireland	38	58%	25%	17%
UK: Scotland	85	67%	14%	19%
Average	-	72%	18%	11%

\* Data missing due to differences in interpretation in translation

Q27.7 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the lawyers

Lawyers	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Albania	589	64%	11%	6%
Belgium	434	64%	8%	8%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	298	73%	18%	9%
Bulgaria	303	54%	24%	22%
Croatia	354	60%	18%	22%
Cyprus	73	85%	8%	7%
Czech Republic	283	77%	18%	5%
Denmark	188	88%	1%	1%
Estonia	79	77%	18%	5%
Finland	287	60%	3%	5%
France	1,880	72%	14%	14%
Germany	1,136	66%	9%	5%
Greece	813	60%	24%	16%
Hungary	1,005	77%	13%	10%
Ireland	134	96%	1%	3%
Italy	558	63%	14%	23%
Latvia	208	50%	28%	22%
Lithuania	188	54%	34%	12%
Moldova	142	61%	24%	15%
Montenegro	85	55%	25%	20%
Netherlands	649	82%	6%	2%
Norway	305	82%	4%	4%
Portugal	871	78%	15%	8%
Romania	1,238	67%	17%	16%
Slovakia	476	64%	25%	11%
Slovenia	173	69%	20%	11%
Spain	1,028	78%	11%	11%
Sweden	494	81%	8%	3%
Ukraine	375	45%	37%	18%
UK: England and Wales	674	89%	6%	4%
UK: Northern Ireland	38	89%	6%	3%
UK: Scotland	85	82%	4%	4%
Average	-	70%	15%	15%

Q27.8 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the Prosecution

Prosecution	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	480	81%	7%	2%
Belgium	424	91%	5%	4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	380	78%	15%	6%
Bulgaria	503	85%	22%	12%
Croatia	348	80%	12%	8%
Cyprus	72	89%	7%	4%
Czech Republic	278	94%	4%	2%
Denmark	182	97%	0%	3%
Estonia	72	91%	38%	2%
Finland	339	87%	16%	1%
France	1,804	87%	6%	7%
Germany	2,763	93%	5%	2%
Greece	738	84%	11%	4%
Hungary	582	76%	18%	6%
Ireland	128	98%	0%	2%
Italy	480	82%	12%	5%
Latvia	205	73%	21%	5%
Lithuania	190	72%	25%	3%
Moldova	143	54%	21%	21%
Montenegro	81	68%	19%	12%
Netherlands	430	95%	3%	2%
Norway	302	94%	3%	3%
Portugal	968	89%	7%	5%
Romania	1,232	82%	10%	8%
Slovakia	562	87%	10%	3%
Slovenia	152	88%	10%	1%
Spain	1,005	80%	7%	13%
Sweden	381	95%	3%	2%
Ukraine	375	59%	34%	16%
UK, England and Wales	507	78%	20%	2%
UK, Northern Ireland	33	79%	18%	3%
UK, Scotland	93	82%	12%	5%
Average	-	87%	12%	8%

Q27.9 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the government

Government	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	581	58%	25%	18%
Belgium	419	37%	24%	39%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	264	66%	22%	12%
Bulgaria	484	31%	32%	37%
Croatia	340	62%	17%	21%
Cyprus	68	74%	18%	7%
Czech Republic	279	38%	38%	23%
Denmark	157	92%	4%	4%
Estonia	79	47%	33%	20%
Finland	288	77%	16%	7%
France	1,958	37%	22%	40%
Germany	3,113	76%	14%	9%
Greece	778	46%	26%	27%
Hungary	1,005	20%	12%	68%
Ireland	133	92%	3%	5%
Italy	544	39%	12%	49%
Latvia	203	52%	31%	17%
Lithuania	201	36%	38%	22%
Moldova	142	38%	26%	41%
Montenegro	83	38%	24%	41%
Netherlands	632	51%	29%	20%
Norway	301	90%	5%	5%
Portugal	958	65%	23%	12%
Romania	1,229	46%	23%	28%
Slovakia	357	48%	28%	23%
Slovenia	180	18%	26%	62%
Spain	660	30%	11%	59%
Sweden	488	82%	8%	8%
Ukraine	374	10%	29%	61%
UK, England and Wales	678	36%	20%	42%
UK, Northern Ireland	55	49%	17%	34%
UK, Scotland	95	34%	25%	41%
Average	-	51%	21%	28%

Q27.10 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by Parliament

Parliament	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	576	66%	23%	11%
Belgium	406	47%	28%	27%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	257	58%	28%	14%
Bulgaria	482	30%	31%	39%
Croatia	341	60%	18%	21%
Cyprus	66	65%	23%	12%
Czech Republic	278	39%	39%	32%
Denmark	157	90%	3%	4%
Estonia	79	47%	36%	23%
Finland	266	78%	18%	3%
France	1,648	48%	25%	30%
Germany	2,095	75%	18%	8%
Greece	774	43%	27%	30%
Hungary	1,005	24%	14%	62%
Ireland	134	80%	5%	5%
Italy	524	43%	18%	42%
Latvia	202	50%	32%	18%
Lithuania	201	31%	34%	34%
Moldova	141	40%	18%	42%
Montenegro	83	34%	19%	47%
Netherlands	625	41%	31%	27%
Norway	302	91%	5%	4%
Portugal	658	63%	25%	12%
Romania	1,233	48%	27%	30%
Slovakia	557	48%	29%	24%
Slovenia	159	15%	24%	61%
Spain	665	32%	15%	53%
Sweden	487	86%	8%	3%
Ukraine	374	12%	29%	59%
UK, England and Wales	678	37%	24%	39%
UK, Northern Ireland	55	43%	31%	26%
UK, Scotland	95	31%	25%	44%
Average	-	50%	27%	28%

Q27.11 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the Media

Media	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	582	51%	28%	21%
Belgium	410	58%	20%	24%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	283	51%	26%	21%
Bulgaria	487	29%	27%	44%
Croatia	347	41%	24%	35%
Cyprus	68	53%	28%	18%
Czech Republic	279	48%	31%	21%
Denmark	162	62%	5%	3%
Estonia	79	59%	20%	20%
Finland	288	81%	12%	7%
France	1,989	31%	23%	46%
Germany	3,103	58%	27%	15%
Greece	766	35%	29%	41%
Hungary	1,004	28%	22%	48%
Ireland	124	67%	8%	5%
Italy	555	34%	15%	51%
Latvia	205	34%	38%	28%
Lithuania	201	22%	38%	39%
Moldova	140	33%	23%	44%
Montenegro	84	32%	21%	46%
Netherlands	634	65%	22%	13%
Norway	304	88%	7%	5%
Portugal	961	51%	24%	24%
Romania	1,235	37%	22%	41%
Slovakia	563	34%	31%	35%
Slovenia	184	22%	25%	43%
Spain	1,013	34%	18%	50%
Sweden	494	95%	14%	7%
Ukraine	374	11%	28%	61%
UK, England and Wales	679	27%	23%	51%
UK, Northern Ireland	28	42%	31%	28%
UK, Scotland	95	28%	28%	45%
Average	-	48%	23%	31%

Q27.12 During the last three years I believe that my independence as a judge has been respected by the social media

Social Media	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Austria	566	27%	41%	32%
Belgium	381	45%	28%	27%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	268	46%	37%	17%
Bulgaria	468	27%	39%	35%
Croatia	335	38%	36%	26%
Cyprus	65	45%	32%	23%
Czech Republic	370	31%	45%	24%
Denmark	129	63%	30%	7%
Estonia	79	34%	44%	22%
Finland	262	44%	42%	14%
France	1,609	28%	24%	48%
Germany	2,976	34%	47%	20%
Greece	769	32%	34%	34%
Hungary	1,000	30%	33%	37%
Ireland	133	35%	41%	23%
Italy	139	32%	35%	33%
Latvia	200	32%	42%	26%
Lithuania	184	20%	46%	35%
Moldova	133	29%	28%	43%
Montenegro	81	32%	25%	43%
Netherlands	567	31%	38%	31%
Norway	291	62%	31%	8%
Portugal	920	46%	33%	21%
Romania	1,218	36%	28%	36%
Slovakia	354	27%	44%	29%
Slovenia	140	14%	37%	49%
Spain	940	31%	25%	45%
Sweden	458	50%	38%	13%
Ukraine	369	10%	58%	32%
UK, England and Wales	667	12%	35%	53%
UK, Northern Ireland	55	20%	43%	37%
UK, Scotland	95	11%	48%	41%
Average	-	33%	38%	31%

### Change over time of independence

Q28. Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, all respondents

	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	579	1%	12%	72%	7%	8%
Belgium	438	8%	25%	64%	3%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	2%	8%	67%	12%	11%
Bulgaria	485	3%	7%	55%	12%	23%
Croatia	357	7%	8%	68%	10%	12%
Cyprus	72	0%	4%	75%	7%	14%
Czech Republic	281	3%	32%	49%	8%	8%
Denmark	162	1%	2%	95%	1%	1%
Estonia	78	5%	13%	73%	3%	6%
Finland	280	0%	13%	70%	10%	0%
France	1 828	2%	18%	72%	7%	2%
Germany	3 086	1%	12%	70%	10%	7%
Greece	792	6%	17%	63%	5%	8%
Hungary	981	38%	27%	44%	2%	1%
Ireland	153	2%	5%	78%	4%	11%
Italy	557	5%	18%	62%	4%	11%
Latvia	210	4%	8%	52%	22%	18%
Lithuania	200	3%	8%	41%	28%	22%
Moldova	144	8%	4%	51%	13%	28%
Montenegro	87	8%	13%	64%	8%	7%
Netherlands	849	1%	18%	77%	3%	0%
Norway	301	1%	18%	73%	8%	1%
Portugal	966	5%	19%	65%	7%	5%
Romania	1 238	2%	9%	54%	6%	28%
Slovakia	474	2%	7%	69%	12%	14%
Slovenia	170	3%	20%	58%	17%	2%
Spain	1 029	15%	28%	53%	3%	2%
Sweden	489	4%	20%	63%	8%	5%
Ukraine	359	23%	10%	38%	16%	9%
UK, England and Wales	884	1%	11%	62%	4%	2%
UK, Northern Ireland	38	8%	11%	81%	3%	0%
UK, Scotland	92	1%	21%	79%	7%	2%
Average	-	5%	14%	69%	8%	8%

Q28.1 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, judges with 0 – 5 years of experience

0 - 5 years experience	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	112	1%	6%	70%	8%	15%
Belgium	116	1%	16%	69%	5%	6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	0%	0%	13%	7%	3%
Bulgaria	66	0%	3%	57%	8%	31%
Croatia	72	0%	6%	75%	7%	13%
Cyprus	38	0%	0%	62%	5%	13%
Czech Republic	62	6%	44%	36%	4%	8%
Denmark	43	0%	0%	88%	2%	0%
Estonia	28	0%	12%	64%	0%	4%
Finland	66	0%	7%	67%	6%	0%
France	396	0%	12%	63%	6%	1%
Germany	597	0%	5%	69%	14%	11%
Greece	172	5%	16%	65%	6%	8%
Hungary	97	16%	32%	46%	3%	3%
Ireland	62	0%	5%	74%	3%	16%
Italy	113	1%	6%	68%	6%	27%
Latvia	63	0%	6%	67%	16%	12%
Lithuania	33	3%	3%	46%	36%	9%
Moldova	38	3%	3%	50%	21%	24%
Montenegro	30	10%	10%	60%	7%	10%
Netherlands	145	0%	7%	66%	8%	1%
Norway	62	0%	6%	67%	7%	0%
Portugal	134	1%	7%	69%	13%	6%
Romania	456	1%	9%	62%	6%	20%
Slovakia	123	0%	7%	66%	11%	13%
Slovenia	35	3%	11%	63%	20%	3%
Spain	118	11%	22%	61%	7%	3%
Sweden	100	0%	6%	74%	8%	6%
Ukraine	62	15%	25%	44%	12%	4%
UK: England and Wales	163	0%	6%	69%	6%	2%
UK: Northern Ireland	11	0%	0%	91%	6%	0%
UK: Scotland	36	0%	14%	78%	6%	3%
Average	-	2%	10%	68%	8%	9%

Q28.2 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, judges with 6 – 10 years of experience

6 - 10 years experience	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	55	0%	13%	71%	2%	13%
Belgium	100	7%	21%	67%	4%	1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	0%	1%	9%	2%	2%
Bulgaria	48	2%	2%	69%	10%	17%
Croatia	16	13%	6%	56%	19%	6%
Cyprus	10	0%	10%	40%	10%	40%
Czech Republic	40	3%	40%	48%	5%	5%
Denmark	32	0%	3%	84%	0%	3%
Estonia	17	0%	12%	88%	0%	0%
Finland	68	0%	12%	78%	9%	1%
France	323	2%	14%	78%	6%	1%
Germany	492	1%	12%	69%	12%	8%
Greece	183	5%	21%	59%	8%	10%
Hungary	155	15%	34%	49%	1%	2%
Ireland	32	3%	3%	88%	8%	0%
Italy	101	2%	12%	76%	4%	3%
Latvia	13	15%	0%	49%	15%	23%
Lithuania	33	0%	12%	52%	18%	18%
Moldova	54	6%	4%	48%	11%	31%
Montenegro	17	12%	6%	71%	6%	6%
Netherlands	90	0%	6%	89%	3%	0%
Norway	87	0%	16%	75%	8%	0%
Portugal	68	4%	14%	72%	3%	8%
Romania	246	3%	14%	52%	5%	28%
Slovakia	98	2%	5%	72%	7%	9%
Slovenia	18	0%	16%	75%	8%	0%
Spain	62	16%	27%	52%	3%	2%
Sweden	115	1%	16%	67%	10%	4%
Ukraine	25	12%	16%	48%	20%	4%
UK: England and Wales	148	0%	8%	67%	3%	2%
UK: Northern Ireland	7	14%	0%	86%	0%	0%
UK: Scotland	29	0%	17%	69%	14%	0%
Average	-	4%	12%	65%	7%	8%

Q28.3 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, judges with 11 – 15 years of experience

11 - 15 years experience	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	128	2%	15%	69%	8%	9%
Belgium	59	3%	24%	73%	0%	0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	0%	1%	11%	2%	1%
Bulgaria	42	5%	7%	57%	12%	19%
Croatia	56	0%	7%	71%	7%	14%
Cyprus	9	0%	11%	67%	22%	0%
Czech Republic	29	3%	21%	69%	7%	0%
Denmark	17	6%	0%	64%	0%	0%
Estonia	7	0%	29%	71%	0%	0%
Finland	62	0%	21%	71%	8%	0%
France	212	4%	18%	72%	8%	0%
Germany	456	1%	13%	71%	9%	0%
Greece	160	9%	20%	63%	2%	6%
Hungary	172	27%	27%	43%	2%	1%
Ireland	29	0%	3%	80%	3%	10%
Italy	59	7%	27%	54%	2%	10%
Latvia	25	12%	4%	40%	36%	8%
Lithuania	36	0%	3%	41%	28%	28%
Moldova	22	0%	0%	64%	5%	27%
Montenegro	8	0%	25%	67%	0%	11%
Netherlands	93	1%	27%	71%	1%	0%
Norway	68	1%	24%	68%	8%	0%
Portugal	100	4%	28%	61%	4%	2%
Romania	214	3%	10%	59%	8%	21%
Slovakia	46	2%	10%	73%	10%	4%
Slovenia	18	0%	11%	67%	22%	0%
Spain	134	15%	30%	50%	1%	4%
Sweden	103	5%	20%	63%	8%	4%
Ukraine	94	25%	12%	33%	12%	9%
UK: England and Wales	170	0%	14%	63%	2%	1%
UK: Northern Ireland	7	0%	29%	71%	0%	0%
UK: Scotland	14	0%	36%	64%	0%	0%
Average	-	5%	16%	63%	7%	6%

Q28.4 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, judges with 16 – 20 years of experience

16 - 20 years experience	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	64	2%	16%	67%	0%	0%
Belgium	67	6%	35%	59%	0%	0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	1%	2%	10%	3%	1%
Bulgaria	106	2%	6%	53%	18%	19%
Croatia	43	2%	17%	67%	10%	0%
Cyprus	7	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Czech Republic	53	6%	30%	52%	6%	0%
Denmark	38	0%	5%	62%	3%	0%
Estonia	4	25%	20%	50%	0%	0%
Finland	30	0%	20%	73%	7%	0%
France	268	3%	26%	64%	9%	0%
Germany	432	1%	14%	74%	7%	4%
Greece	94	4%	16%	67%	2%	7%
Hungary	142	31%	25%	43%	1%	1%
Ireland	7	14%	29%	57%	0%	0%
Italy	46	11%	20%	63%	0%	7%
Latvia	66	3%	5%	58%	22%	12%
Lithuania	31	13%	13%	39%	29%	10%
Moldova	18	11%	11%	50%	11%	17%
Montenegro	12	0%	33%	58%	8%	0%
Netherlands	92	1%	24%	75%	0%	0%
Norway	42	0%	26%	62%	10%	3%
Portugal	160	6%	23%	62%	6%	3%
Romania	143	5%	7%	51%	3%	34%
Slovakia	52	4%	2%	67%	15%	12%
Slovenia	39	5%	31%	46%	15%	3%
Spain	118	13%	36%	47%	3%	1%
Sweden	67	6%	33%	52%	3%	3%
Ukraine	69	33%	10%	28%	22%	6%
UK: England and Wales	69	2%	16%	75%	4%	3%
UK: Northern Ireland	6	0%	17%	80%	0%	0%
UK: Scotland	6	13%	50%	25%	0%	13%
Average	-	7%	20%	58%	7%	0%

Q28.5 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, judges with 21– 25 years of experience

21 - 25 years experience	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	88	1%	15%	73%	7%	2%
Belgium	58	13%	25%	57%	4%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	0%	1%	7%	0%	2%
Bulgaria	58	4%	8%	48%	12%	28%
Croatia	44	7%	5%	70%	11%	7%
Cyprus	4	0%	0%	75%	0%	25%
Czech Republic	53	2%	42%	49%	8%	0%
Denmark	18	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Estonia	13	8%	15%	54%	8%	15%
Finland	17	0%	6%	76%	18%	0%
France	281	2%	21%	66%	8%	2%
Germany	381	2%	18%	69%	9%	3%
Greece	63	6%	11%	71%	8%	5%
Hungary	180	32%	28%	38%	1%	2%
Ireland	2	50%	0%	50%	0%	0%
Italy	47	6%	15%	70%	2%	8%
Latvia	22	0%	14%	59%	14%	21%
Lithuania	27	0%	0%	48%	30%	22%
Moldova	8	11%	0%	33%	22%	33%
Montenegro	5	0%	20%	60%	0%	0%
Netherlands	115	1%	23%	73%	2%	1%
Norway	24	4%	13%	75%	8%	0%
Portugal	225	6%	22%	63%	9%	4%
Romania	75	1%	8%	43%	12%	36%
Slovakia	48	2%	6%	57%	14%	20%
Slovenia	23	0%	30%	61%	9%	0%
Spain	238	18%	30%	47%	3%	2%
Sweden	38	3%	28%	59%	10%	3%
Ukraine	51	18%	16%	33%	20%	8%
UK: England and Wales	60	3%	15%	73%	8%	2%
UK: Northern Ireland	2	50%	0%	50%	0%	0%
UK: Scotland	4	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Average	-	8%	13%	60%	8%	8%

Q28.6 Since I started to serve as a judge my independence has Improved much, Improved a little, Stayed the same, Deteriorated a little or Deteriorated much, judges with over 25 years of experience

Over 25 years experience	Response	Deteriorated much	Deteriorated a little	Stayed the same	Improved a little	Improved much
Austria	139	2%	12%	76%	8%	2%
Belgium	48	6%	35%	54%	0%	2%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	301	0%	1%	17%	3%	4%
Bulgaria	132	3%	8%	55%	11%	23%
Croatia	127	4%	7%	64%	10%	13%
Cyprus	4	0%	25%	75%	0%	0%
Czech Republic	54	0%	11%	48%	13%	28%
Denmark	13	0%	6%	62%	0%	0%
Estonia	12	17%	0%	58%	8%	17%
Finland	28	0%	14%	57%	20%	0%
France	469	2%	12%	66%	12%	7%
Germany	847	2%	12%	72%	7%	3%
Greece	90	2%	10%	62%	7%	19%
Hungary	315	25%	24%	46%	3%	2%
Ireland	1	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Italy	191	6%	26%	56%	0%	7%
Latvia	52	4%	6%	44%	27%	19%
Lithuania	37	3%	5%	24%	30%	34%
Moldova	3	0%	33%	67%	0%	0%
Montenegro	14	14%	0%	57%	21%	7%
Netherlands	114	4%	23%	70%	3%	0%
Norway	18	0%	6%	61%	17%	17%
Portugal	285	5%	16%	69%	8%	3%
Romania	104	2%	3%	29%	4%	63%
Slovakia	104	2%	7%	53%	16%	23%
Slovenia	39	5%	15%	54%	23%	3%
Spain	361	15%	21%	57%	4%	2%
Sweden	38	11%	20%	51%	11%	6%
Ukraine	27	7%	11%	37%	15%	30%
UK: England and Wales	24	0%	17%	62%	0%	0%
UK: Northern Ireland	3	0%	33%	67%	0%	0%
UK: Scotland	1	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Average	-	5%	12%	60%	8%	11%

## Personal and professional characteristics of respondents

### Q29 Gender

Gender	Response	Did not answer	Identify otherwise	Male	Female
Austria	655	1%	0%	49%	54%
Belgium	466	1%	0%	41%	59%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	325	2%	0%	35%	62%
Bulgaria	528	1%	0%	36%	63%
Croatia	378	2%	0%	28%	72%
Cyprus	78	0%	0%	49%	50%
Czech Republic	295	1%	0%	62%	46%
Denmark	128	1%	0%	48%	49%
Estonia	82	1%	0%	21%	79%
Finland	308	2%	0%	33%	64%
France	2,121	1%	0%	32%	68%
Germany	1,369	1%	0%	52%	47%
Greece	870	2%	0%	30%	69%
Hungary	1,032	2%	0%	35%	62%
Ireland	138	2%	0%	54%	44%
Italy	616	1%	0%	57%	42%
Latvia	217	1%	0%	24%	74%
Lithuania	212	1%	0%	35%	63%
Moldova	138	1%	0%	48%	52%
Montenegro	95	0%	0%	38%	64%
Netherlands	670	1%	0%	41%	57%
Norway	313	0%	0%	60%	50%
Portugal	1,014	1%	0%	31%	69%
Romania	1,345	1%	0%	28%	71%
Slovakia	648	1%	0%	43%	56%
Slovenia	185	1%	0%	21%	78%
Spain	1,113	2%	0%	47%	51%
Sweden	513	1%	0%	48%	51%
Ukraine	431	1%	0%	48%	51%
UK: England and Wales	703	1%	0%	61%	39%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	0%	0%	69%	41%
UK: Scotland	89	0%	0%	64%	36%
Average	-	1%	0%	41%	57%

Q30 Experience

Years of judicial experience	Response	0-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	Over 25 years
Austria	605	20%	10%	21%	11%	15%	23%
Belgium	499	27%	23%	14%	17%	17%	11%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	105	18%	15%	18%	18%	15%	26%
Bulgaria	538	14%	8%	8%	21%	20%	27%
Croatia	378	20%	5%	17%	17%	12%	30%
Cyprus	78	54%	14%	12%	10%	5%	5%
Czech Republic	395	20%	15%	17%	17%	18%	23%
Denmark	176	26%	20%	11%	24%	11%	7%
Estonia	82	32%	23%	8%	8%	18%	16%
Finland	306	31%	24%	16%	11%	8%	9%
France	2,121	27%	17%	11%	12%	12%	24%
Germany	1,569	17%	14%	15%	14%	12%	28%
Greece	670	22%	24%	20%	12%	12%	11%
Hungary	1,032	8%	15%	18%	14%	18%	30%
Ireland	136	46%	15%	21%	8%	2%	1%
Italy	618	20%	18%	17%	8%	10%	24%
Latvia	217	17%	8%	12%	20%	11%	24%
Lithuania	212	17%	18%	19%	15%	14%	18%
Moldova	104	28%	28%	15%	12%	8%	3%
Montenegro	90	32%	20%	17%	14%	8%	19%
Netherlands	670	23%	14%	14%	14%	17%	17%
Norway	313	28%	22%	22%	14%	8%	6%
Portugal	1,014	10%	7%	17%	18%	24%	27%
Romania	1,348	17%	20%	17%	11%	8%	8%
Slovakia	648	25%	20%	10%	12%	10%	23%
Slovenia	162	23%	18%	16%	23%	12%	20%
Spain	1,113	17%	8%	14%	12%	22%	20%
Sweden	513	21%	24%	20%	19%	8%	7%
Ukraine	421	28%	8%	25%	20%	12%	7%
UK - England and Wales	703	25%	22%	20%	15%	8%	8%
UK - Northern Ireland	37	35%	12%	18%	18%	3%	8%
UK - Scotland	98	37%	24%	19%	8%	4%	7%
Average	-	24%	17%	18%	14%	17%	17%

Q31 I work primarily at:

Type of court	Response	Court of first instance	Appeal court	Supreme Court/ Court of Cassation
Austria	605	85%	10%	7%
Belgium	495	80%	16%	0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	325	69%	26%	3%
Bulgaria	528	76%	16%	8%
Croatia	378	78%	20%	2%
Cyprus	78	95%	4%	1%
Czech Republic	285	73%	23%	2%
Denmark	179	72%	25%	3%
Estonia	82	87%	13%	0%
Finland	308	58%	33%	8%
France	2 121	74%	22%	4%
Germany	3 399	75%	20%	5%
Greece	870	76%	12%	10%
Hungary	1 032	71%	26%	3%
Ireland	138	86%	10%	4%
Italy	616	82%	13%	5%
Latvia	217	67%	26%	7%
Lithuania	212	54%	25%	11%
Moldova	158	80%	16%	4%
Montenegro	90	82%	11%	7%
Netherlands	670	83%	17%	0%
Norway	313	65%	31%	4%
Portugal	1 014	83%	16%	1%
Romania	1 345	84%	15%	2%
Slovakia	646	65%	26%	7%
Slovenia	185	79%	19%	1%
Spain	1 113	70%	26%	1%
Sweden	512	69%	28%	3%
Ukraine	431	80%	13%	7%
UK: England and Wales	703	91%	6%	0%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	95%	5%	0%
UK: Scotland	99	98%	2%	0%
Average	-	77%	19%	4%

Q32 I primarily adjudicate:

Type of cases	Response	administrative cases	civil (including family) cases	criminal cases	civil and criminal cases in equal measure	civil, administrative and criminal
Austria	605	37%	51%	9%	2%	0%
Belgium	468	1%	58%	28%	12%	0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	325	5%	57%	24%	11%	4%
Bulgaria	528	18%	43%	26%	8%	7%
Croatia	378	4%	82%	32%	1%	1%
Cyprus	78	8%	27%	26%	40%	0%
Czech Republic	295	7%	73%	19%	1%	0%
Denmark	178	1%	6%	13%	51%	30%
Estonia	82	23%	46%	29%	1%	0%
Finland	368	39%	19%	20%	21%	1%
France	2 121	1%	48%	35%	13%	2%
Germany	2 369	27%	48%	21%	3%	1%
Greece	870	35%	17%	8%	40%	0%
Hungary	1 832	6%	55%	37%	1%	1%
Ireland	138	4%	32%	40%	15%	8%
Italy	818	39%	27%	32%	2%	0%
Latvia	217	16%	46%	33%	2%	0%
Lithuania	212	9%	36%	28%	10%	13%
Moldova	158	4%	20%	21%	18%	39%
Montenegro	80	4%	47%	40%	7%	2%
Netherlands	870	21%	42%	32%	3%	1%
Norway	313	0%	4%	2%	52%	41%
Portugal	1 914	0%	45%	35%	19%	1%
Romania	1 345	12%	53%	19%	11%	5%
Slovakia	848	7%	57%	24%	1%	0%
Slovenia	185	6%	68%	23%	1%	2%
Spain	1 113	10%	36%	28%	22%	1%
Sweden	513	26%	6%	25%	26%	2%
Ukraine	431	19%	23%	11%	5%	42%
UK: England and Wales	700	17%	51%	27%	1%	2%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	6%	38%	46%	3%	3%
UK: Scotland	99	5%	14%	19%	52%	9%
Average	-	14%	40%	25%	14%	7%

Q33 I am a member of a judges association

Member of a judges association	Response	yes	no
Austria	605	92%	8%
Belgium	468	38%	62%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	325	77%	23%
Bulgaria	528	31%	69%
Croatia	378	66%	34%
Cyprus	78	100%	0%
Czech Republic	395	37%	63%
Denmark	176	100%	0%
Estonia	82	73%	27%
Finland	368	50%	50%
France	2 121	50%	50%
Germany	3 389	75%	25%
Greece	870	88%	12%
Hungary	1 032	48%	52%
Ireland	138	98%	2%
Italy	618	68%	32%
Latvia	217	56%	44%
Lithuania	212	66%	34%
Moldova	158	44%	56%
Montenegro	90	77%	23%
Netherlands	670	69%	31%
Norway	313	93%	7%
Portugal	1 014	85%	15%
Romania	1 345	11%	89%
Slovakia	649	42%	58%
Slovenia	185	68%	32%
Spain	1 113	68%	32%
Sweden	513	40%	60%
Ukraine	431	19%	81%
UK: England and Wales	703	79%	21%
UK: Northern Ireland	37	79%	21%
UK: Scotland	99	68%	32%
Average	-	66%	34%