President of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic Marcela Kosová reacts to the statement of Juraj Kliment
Juraj Kliment, a judge of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, published a statement on the website of the ZOJ initiative, in which he stated, among other things, that "The Minister of Justice was backed up in this disciplinary case by the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. As a constitutional body of judicial legitimacy, instead of opposing the misuse of the means of disciplinary law by political and public power, it adopted a resolution supporting the disciplinary motion by essentially prejudging my guilt in point 3 of the disciplinary motion. This is an extraordinary disqualification of this constitutional organ of judicial legitimacy, which confirms the unequal treatment of judges".
Marcela Kosová refers to the resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic from February 25, 2025, case No. IV ÚS 82/2025, by which it rejected the constitutional complaint of Juraj Kliment. The Constitutional Court stated, among other things, that the constitutional complaint and its annexes show that the complainant, as a judge of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, had been subject to disciplinary charges in proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic under case No. 33D/6/2024. On 5 September 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court, following Section 25(2) of Act No. 432/2021 Coll. on the Disciplinary Rules of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic and Amendments and Supplements to Certain Acts (Disciplinary Court Rules), as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Court Rules (DCR)"), requested the Judicial Council to provide an opinion on two issues concerning the compliance of the complainant's conduct with the principles of judicial ethics.
The Constitutional Court fully referred to the conclusions of the decision in case No. I. ÚS 680/2024 (concerning a similar factual and legal situation of the same complainant), according to which the application of a systematic and teleological interpretation of Art. 25(2) of the Court Disciplinary Rules, it must be concluded that the provision of an opinion by the competent authority at the request of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court under Section 25(2) is not a judicial or other decision-making process, but an institution of a purely procedural nature, always relating to a specific ongoing disciplinary proceeding, the result of which is a decision on the merits. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the opinion of the competent authority by means of which it puts forward an interpretation of the principles or rules of ethics does not cause prejudice to the subjective rights of the disciplinary defendant. In fact, it does not interfere with his subjective rights, as it does not constitute a final decision on the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. In terms of any interference with the legal status of a particular disciplinary defendant, that interference arises only with the final decision and, therefore, only with the eventual finding of guilt by the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court and the imposition of a disciplinary measure.
According to the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Council thus issued the contested order, which was accompanied by the opinion of the Judicial Council, through which it responded to the request of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court under Art. 2 of the DCR in the complainant's disciplinary proceedings, provided a general interpretation of the principles of ethics in principle, it did not directly interfere with the complainant's legal position, and therefore the applicability of the partial components of the fundamental right to other legal protection (Article 46(1) of the Constitution) in the form of hearing the case in the presence of the disciplinary defendant and his right to express his views on the grounds for the decision of the Judicial Council is excluded in the case under consideration.
Following the above-stated legal conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Marcela Kosová stresses that since the Judicial Council fulfils its statutory obligation to interpret the principles of judicial ethics at the request of the Disciplinary Chamber, it acts following the applicable legislation. Otherwise, the Judicial Council would resign to respect the rule of law. Loyalty to the rule of law must be insisted upon unconditionally and set an example for the public. This applies not only to the Judicial Council but also to every judge.
Marcela Kosová refers to the resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic from February 25, 2025, case No. IV ÚS 82/2025, by which it rejected the constitutional complaint of Juraj Kliment. The Constitutional Court stated, among other things, that the constitutional complaint and its annexes show that the complainant, as a judge of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, had been subject to disciplinary charges in proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic under case No. 33D/6/2024. On 5 September 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court, following Section 25(2) of Act No. 432/2021 Coll. on the Disciplinary Rules of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic and Amendments and Supplements to Certain Acts (Disciplinary Court Rules), as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "Disciplinary Court Rules (DCR)"), requested the Judicial Council to provide an opinion on two issues concerning the compliance of the complainant's conduct with the principles of judicial ethics.
The Constitutional Court fully referred to the conclusions of the decision in case No. I. ÚS 680/2024 (concerning a similar factual and legal situation of the same complainant), according to which the application of a systematic and teleological interpretation of Art. 25(2) of the Court Disciplinary Rules, it must be concluded that the provision of an opinion by the competent authority at the request of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court under Section 25(2) is not a judicial or other decision-making process, but an institution of a purely procedural nature, always relating to a specific ongoing disciplinary proceeding, the result of which is a decision on the merits. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the opinion of the competent authority by means of which it puts forward an interpretation of the principles or rules of ethics does not cause prejudice to the subjective rights of the disciplinary defendant. In fact, it does not interfere with his subjective rights, as it does not constitute a final decision on the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. In terms of any interference with the legal status of a particular disciplinary defendant, that interference arises only with the final decision and, therefore, only with the eventual finding of guilt by the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court and the imposition of a disciplinary measure.
According to the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Council thus issued the contested order, which was accompanied by the opinion of the Judicial Council, through which it responded to the request of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Administrative Court under Art. 2 of the DCR in the complainant's disciplinary proceedings, provided a general interpretation of the principles of ethics in principle, it did not directly interfere with the complainant's legal position, and therefore the applicability of the partial components of the fundamental right to other legal protection (Article 46(1) of the Constitution) in the form of hearing the case in the presence of the disciplinary defendant and his right to express his views on the grounds for the decision of the Judicial Council is excluded in the case under consideration.
Following the above-stated legal conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, Marcela Kosová stresses that since the Judicial Council fulfils its statutory obligation to interpret the principles of judicial ethics at the request of the Disciplinary Chamber, it acts following the applicable legislation. Otherwise, the Judicial Council would resign to respect the rule of law. Loyalty to the rule of law must be insisted upon unconditionally and set an example for the public. This applies not only to the Judicial Council but also to every judge.
